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PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF CLASS SUITS* 
Joseph ]. Simeonet 
THE complexity of contemporary society constantly creates new stresses on judicial administration. Ingenuity is called for to 
produce new methods1 ( or to modify and streamline old methods) in 
order to alleviate congested dockets,2 avoid lengthy jury trials,3 and 
in general to liberalize traditional rules of procedure and evidence 
with the object of furthering the quick and efficient disposition of 
disputes. Instances of progress toward achieving these ends include 
the introduction of workable rules for discovery, pre-trial confer-
ences and summary and declaratory judgments, the abolition of 
technical and dilatory tactics in pleading, and the liberalization of 
such remedies as interpleader and intervention. 
But modernization of the so-called "class" or "representative" 
suit as a procedural device has not kept pace to meet the needs of 
contemporary society. The present study is proffered to demon-
strate the fact of that lag, to trace its causes, and to support the con-
clusion that legislation in the form of a model or uniform law is 
now needed to make the representative suit a more useful member 
of the modern family of remedies. 
In the past several decades the courts have been called upon 
to resolve controversies in which numerous persons may have 
acquired separate and distinct rights against a common adversary 
because of a single fact-event.4 Obvious examples include monopo-
listic practices damaging numerous potential competitors or cus-
• This article is a part of a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of The University 
of Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the S.J.D. degree. 
-Ed. 
t Professor of Law, St. Louis University.-Ed. 
1 Judge Yankwich in "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41 (1953), has commented 
at 42: "As societies become more complex and law becomes more formalized, the legal 
conflicts which arise take on the complexity of the materials out of which they arise. The 
determination of these conflicts calls not only for greater social control, but also, for 
procedural schemes that will enable judicial bodies to handle the complex problems and 
do so efficiently." 
2 See the series of articles in Symposium, Lagging Justice, 328 Annals 7-163 (March 
1960). 
3 Palmer, On Trial: The Jury Trial, 20 F.R.D. 65 (1958). 
4 Since the adoption of the federal rules there have been approximately 225 reported 
decisions in the federal courts and some 200 reported cases in the state courts. Contrast 
this with only sixteen cases in the American Digest before 1900. 
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tomers,5 overcharges by a public utility upon the citizenry of a 
whole city,6 and fraudulent activities injuring numerous victims.7 
The unique virtue of the representative suit, once made avail-
able, is that it enables a court, once and for all in a single action, 
to dispose of the issues in such cases which are the same as to each 
of many persons too numerous for all to be joined. A dramatic 
example would be the commission of a mass tort. Hundreds, per-
haps thousands, might be personally injured by an explosion of 
combustible material, by a fire at a crowded place, or by emissions 
of an atomic reactor gone awry. It would be naive to expect com-
parable problems not to become more usual, even more acute. 
Recently, for example, the United States was sued, after it had 
conducted a series of nuclear tests, for damages for the loss of sheep 
suffering lesions which might have been explainable as side effects 
of nuclear radiation.8 While the court found no causal connection 
between the injury and the nuclear tests in this instance, the occur-
rence of such claims will undoubtedly increase. In common situa-
tions if multiple, separate but identical claims continue to have to 
be tried entirely separately, prohibitive burdens well may be 
placed upon already overburdened judicial systems which might 
give cause for the establishment of additional administrative or 
quasi-judicial machinery to dispose of them, further ousting courts 
from their proper adjudicatory sphere. Yet each claim, whether 
separately or collectively determined, may present the same issues 
and require the same evidence from many of the same witnesses. 
Practically, under existing codes and rules, solutions are neces-
sarily ad hoc.9 
One of the remedies traditionally available when one side in 
a particular case is comprised of multiple parties has been the 
equitable "class" or "representative" suit, in which one or more 
5 Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942); 
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); State Wholesale Grocers v. Great 
Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Hess v. Anderson, Clayton &: Co., 20 
F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Cal. 1957). 
6 Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938); Davies v. 
Gas&: Elec. Co., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949), reversing 79 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1948). 
7 Society Millon Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 
(1939); Brenner v. Title Guarantee &: Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937). 
8 Bulloch v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1956). 
9 Cf. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 
111 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 493 (1954); Note, 60 YALE L.J. 
1417 (1951). 
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members of a "class" may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole 
group. The class suit remedy as it exists today, however, is so lim-
ited that it does not fill the need for representative proceedings 
outlined above. Born as a device of convenience to dispose only of a 
situation in which a true community or class interest existed, its 
original concepts have become categorized and crystalized, so that 
the limitations imposed by history and embodied in the present 
rules curtail modification of the remedy to serve expanding needs. 
The traditional remedy requires that the interested persons com-
prise a definite group, but that the group be so large that it is 
impractical to bring all of its members before the court; more im-
portant, a positive showing must be made that the interests of the 
parties of record are identical with those of the absentees so that 
adequate and effective representation of the latter interests will be 
insured. And in this context special procedural problems arise in 
pleading, service of process, discovery, amount in controversy, con-
trol of litigation, and intervention which take on more than the 
usual importance. 
The true and hybrid class actions, to be defined later, have 
been used in many situations to fill a variety of societal demands: 
to protect the civil rights of individuals,10 to test the constitution-
ality of legislation, 11 to secure the rights of employees in a mecha-
nized society, 12 to enable suits by or against an unincorporated 
association.13 By adopting this method of disposing of multi-party 
interests, the judiciary avoids multiplicity of actions, saves expense 
and time, and obviates relitigation of issues which are common to 
all members of the class. 
The situations already discussed involving separate but iden-
tical rights similarly demand a procedure that is quick, effective, 
and competent to dispose of common problems and thus avoid un-
necessary litigation. The so-called "spurious" suit, however, has 
10 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 
(N.D. Ala. 1955); Comment, Class Action, A Study of Group-Interest Litigation, 1 RACE 
REL. L. REP. 991 (1956). 
11 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
12 Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947). 
13 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945); 
Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 271 Pa. 419, 114 Atl. 377 (1921); Brunson, 
Some Problems Presented by Unincorporated Associations in Civil Procedure, 7 S.C.L.Q . 
.!194 (1955); Kalven &: Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. 
CHI. L. R.Ev. 684 (1941); Keeffe, Levy &: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 
ll27 (1948); Note, 46 Cor..uM. L. REv. 818 (1946); Note, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472 (1954). 
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not been expanded to meet modern needs. It has failed to develop 
into a remedy which, on the one hand, guarantees every person 
his "day in court" and, on the other hand, avoids unnecessary, 
repetitive litigation. 
The purpose of this article is to discuss numerous aspects of 
the class device, to discuss the many procedural problems confront-
ing court and counsel, to determine the effectiveness of one type of 
class suit-the spurious-and in the conclusion, to propose legis-
lation for a new rule independent of the rules regarding class 
actions, a remedy which would more effectively permit the dis-
patch of numerous claims arising from similar fact patterns. 
I. PROGRESSION TO THE PRESENT RULES 
Developed in equity to circumvent the stringency of joinder 
requirements, 14 the class suit doctrine was a necessary development 
in its time if justice was to be done. The fundamental rule in 
equity was, and is, "that all persons, materially interested in the 
subject of the suit, however numerous, ought to be parties: that 
there may be a complete Decree between all parties having mate-
rial interests .... "15 
In order to escape somewhat from the limitations of this strict 
rule a necessary exception was engrafted,rn so that justice could be 
14 See REDESDALE, CHANCERY PLEADINGS 144 (2d ed. 1789); Poore v. Clark, 2 Atk. 515, 26 
Eng. Rep. 710 (Ch. 1742). 
15 Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 325, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007 (Ch. 1809) 
(Lord Eldon). 
16 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 63, at 397 (1947); 1 DANIELLS, CHANCERY PLEADING AND 
PRACTICE 190 (6th ed. 1894); STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS 87 (8th ed. 1870); 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); see also Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 
Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944). Lord Eldon in Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 325, 33 
Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007 (1809) said: "But that [the principle that all persons materially 
interested ought to be made parties], being a general rule, established for the convenient 
administration of justice, must not be adhered to in cases, to which consistently with 
practical convenience it is incapable of application." 
In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940), Mr. Justice Stone said: "The class suit was 
an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of 
those interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties 
in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable. Courts are not infrequently 
called upon to proceed with causes in which the number of those interested in the litiga• 
tion is so great as to make difficult or impossible the joinder of all because some are not 
within the jurisdiction or because their whereabouts is unknown or where if all were 
made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the death of some would prevent or 
unduly delay a decree. In such cases where the interests of those not joined are of the 
same class as the interest of those who are, and where it is considered that the latter 
fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the issues in which all 
have a common interest, the court will proceed to a decree." 
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accomplished in cases where the substance, if not the strict letter, 
of res judicata could be satisfied without complete joinder. If the 
parties of record had interests identical to those of absent persons 
to whom they were consensually related, the parties present might 
represent the absentees and assert their interests. 
The English developments were summarized in this country 
by Story in his Commentaries.17 After examining the English deci-
sions, Story arranged the principles relative to class actions into 
three categories: 
"l. [W]here the question is one of a common or general 
interest, and one or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the 
whole; 
"2. [W]here the parties form a voluntary association for 
public or private purposes, and those, who sue, or defend, 
may fairly be presumed to represent the rights and interests 
of the whole; 
"3. [W]here the parties are very numerous, and although 
they have, or may have separate, distinct interests; yet it is 
impracticable to bring them all before the court."18 
Story's language was adopted in the codes,19 first in New York,20 
and then in other states.21 Decisions interpreting the code provi-
sion have applied the principles originally developed in equity and 
summarized by Story. Under the codes, class suits have been author-
ized in several situations: (I) where the interests of the members 
of the class are joint,22 or common;23 (2) where the interests of the 
17 STORY, op. cit. supra note 16, ch. V. 
18 Id. at 105. 
19 The usual statute provides: \Vhere the question is one of a common or general 
interest of many persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very 
numerous, and it may be -impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more 
may sue or defend for the benefit of all. 
20 N. Y. Code of 1849, § 119; N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr: § 195. 
21 The following states have statutes identical or similar to the code provisions (note 
19 supra): ALASKA COMP. LAws ANN. § 55-3-16 (1949); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (1947); 
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 382; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-105 (1958); FLA. RULES CIV. PROC. 
§ 3.6 (1961). GA. CODE ANN. § 37.1002 (1936); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-220 (Burns 1933); KAN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-413 (1949); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-319 (1956); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr: 
§ 195; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-70 (1953); OHIO REv. CODE § 2307.21 (Baldwin 1958): OKLA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. tit. 12, § 233 (1960); ORE. REv. STAT. § 13.170 (1961); PA. RULES CIV. 
PRoc. rule 2230 (1951); S.C. CODE § 10-205 (1952); S.D. CODE § 33.0410 (1939); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 4.08.070 (1956); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 260.12 (1957). 
22 Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893). 
23 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Penny v. Central Coal &: Coke 
Co., 138 Fed. 769 (8th Cir. 1905); Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Church, 119 Cal. 477, 51 
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members of the class are several, but each is interested in a fund or 
property involved in the action;24 (3) where the interests of the 
members of the class are several, but each is interested in the same 
relief.25 
A few years before the adoption of the code provision in New 
York, Federal Equity Rule 48 had formally authorized class suits 
in the federal system, 26 although the remedy was well known prior 
to the adoption of the formal rule.27 The rule itself caused some 
speculation28 because of its language that "the decree shall be with-
out prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties." If 
this portion of the rule were taken literally, no absent party would 
be bound by the suit, and there would be an inconsistency between 
the rule and former decisions. If taken literally the efficiency of the 
class device would be seriously hampered. But when the class suit 
was used subsequent to the rule, that portion was disregarded.29 
In 1912 when Federal Equity Rule 38,30 which followed the code 
provision, 31 was passed, that portion of rule 48 was omitted. 
When the present federal rules were being considered over a 
score of years ago, Professor Moore argued that, "A real service 
would be rendered the profession if a rule were promulgated 
Pac. 841 (1897); Bates v. Houston, 66 Ga. 198 (1880); Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 
N.E. 335 (1932). 
24 Guffanti v. National Sur. Co., 133 App. Div. 610, 118 N.Y. Supp. 207, afj'd, 196 
N.Y. 452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909); Gibson v. American Loan &: Trust Co., 12 N.Y. Supp. 444 
(Sup. Ct. 1890). 
25 Climax Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 54 Misc. 152, 103 N.Y. Supp. 822 (1907); 
Hawarden v. Youghiogheny &: Lehigh Coal Co., Ill Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901). 
26 42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi (1843). "Where the parties on either side are very numerous, 
and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all 
brought before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them 
parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all 
the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. 
But in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the 
absent parties." 
27 Mandeville v. Riggs, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 482 (1829); West v. Randall, 29 Fed. Cas. 718, 
722 (No. 17424) (C.C.R.I. 1820). 
28 1 STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRAcnCE 344 (1909). 
29 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853). 
30 226 U.S. appendix 11 (1912). 
31 When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons consti-
tuting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, 
one or more may sue or defend for the whole. For a history of federal rules 38 and 48, 
see 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 23.01, at 661 (1951); Lesar, Class Suits and the 
Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. R.Ev. 34 (1937); Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litiga-
tion in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. R.Ev. 874, 928 (1958). 
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which was really informative."32 This history of the class device, 
the confusion existing in the decisions rendered under the code 
provisions, and the uncertainty of the prior federal rules were 
influential in the attempt to draft a modern rule. Nevertheless, 
in the Preliminary Draft there was not even a separate rule on the 
subject until Moore suggested one which substantially conforms to 
present rule 23. Moore's proposal relating to the effect of judg-
ment33 was modified, however, because the committee believed 
that it was beyond its function to deal with the question of the 
effect of judgment since this was a matter of substantive law.34 
Rule 23, therefore, emerged in its present form,35 and has been 
subsequently adopted by several states.36 
II. FEATURES OF CLASS SUITS 
The unique feature of the class suit is its adjudication of the 
interests of absent parties so as to preclude additional litigation. 
This is undoubtedly its most worthwhile attribute. Evolving as it 
32 Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Pre-
liminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 571 (1937). 
33 Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307, 555 (1937-38). 
34 See the comment of the committee in 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 'If 23.11, at 3456 
(2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]. 
35 Frn. R. CIV. P. 23: "(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so 
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, 
one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, 
sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the 
class is 
" (1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right 
refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to 
enforce it; 
"(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or 
may affect specific property involved in the action; or 
"(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights 
and a common relief is sought. • • • 
"(c) DISMISSAL OR CoMPROMISE. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised 
without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in 
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or com-
promise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. 
If the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given 
only if the court requires it.'' 
36 The following states have statutes or rules based on rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: ALA. R. Crv. P. 31 (equity) (1960); ARiz. R. Crv. P. 23 (1956); COLO. R. 
CIV. P. 23 (1953); DEL. R. CT. CHAN. 23 (1952); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 23 (1957); IOWA R. CIV. 
P. 42 (1951); KY. R. CIV. P. 23 (1953); MINN. R. C1v. P. 23 (1952); Mo. REv. STAT. § 
507.070 (1959); MONT. REV. CODE § 93-2704-7 (1962); N.M.R. CIV. P. § 21-1-1(23) (1953); 
N.D.R. CIV. P. 23 (1960); TEX. R. CIV. P. 42 (1955); UTAH R. CIV. P. 23 (1953); WYo. 
R. CIV. P. 23 (1957). 
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did, necessarily the general principles of res judicata have been, 
almost without exception, applied to the traditional types of class 
actions so that the represented absentees, whether they desire it or 
not, whether the action is known to them or not, are bound by the 
results of a class adjudication. In the traditional type action (not 
the so-called "spurious") that is as it should be and, for proper 
judicial administration, as perhaps it must be. 
But in order that this overriding principle be applied, other 
considerations become incidentally enmeshed in the remedy. The 
factors inherent in such suits have been succinctly set forth by the 
court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Kainz v. Anheuser-
Busch, lnc.: 31 "I), the parties must be so numerous as to make 
it impractical to bring them all before the court; 2), the plaintiffs 
must adequately represent the class; and 3), there must be some 
community of interest."38 
The requirement that the members of the class must be so 
"numerous" as to make it impractical to bring all the parties be-
fore the court has not been a particularly troublesome question. 
While no formula has been devised for determining "impractica-
bility," involvement of a large number of individuals naturally 
makes it highly impractical because of the difficulties of service and 
fluctuations by deaths, etc., to name all the members of the class as 
parties. The size of the group has therefore been decisive.39 
More troublesome is the requisite that the parties representing 
the class must "fairly insure the adequate representation of all."40 
The rules do not and could not set forth all the details that must 
be observed to satisfy the requirement of adequate representa-
37 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952). 
38 Id. at 740. Other articles and decisions which discuss the various requirements of 
class suits: Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Matthies v. Sey-
mour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64 (D. Conn. 1958); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving 
Numerous Litigants, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 402-18 (1934); Comment, 6 STAN. L. REV. 120, 
141 (1953); Comment, II Sw. L.J. 210 (1957). 
39 It has been held that it is not impractical to join seven, Jackman v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 4 F.R.D. 172 (W.D. Mo. 1944), or eleven, Statler v. Mock, 12 F.R.D. 409 (W.D. Pa. 
1952). It has been held not impractical to join forty persons, Atwood v. National Bank, 
115 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1940). When the number reaches hundreds, Rank v. Krug, 90 F. 
Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Carter v. School Bd., 182 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1950) (by implica• 
tion), or thousands, Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D., 385 (D. Neb. 1947); 
Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944), courts uniformly are satisfied that 
joinder is impractical. 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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tion. As one decision said, "any attempt to do so would be fore-
doomed. "41 Courts42 often repeat Professor Moore's formula: 
" ... In determining the question the court must consider 
(I) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with 
the other members of the class; (2) whether his interests are 
antagonistic in any way to the interests of those whom he 
represents; (3) the proportion of those made parties as com-
pared to the total membership of the class; (4) any other 
factors bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for 
the rest of the class; and (5) the type of class action involved."43 
One essential ingredient of adequacy of representation is that 
the representatives be actual members of the class which they pur-
port to represent. In Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,44 plaintiff 
instituted an action for an accounting for surplus funds accumu-
lated under a group insurance policy. His petition alleged that he 
brought the action not only for himself, but for the benefit of all 
former and present employees of the defendant. The court held 
that in this instance the plaintiff could not fairly and adequately 
represent the other employees since he had not been an employee 
for some time and was not presently insured under the group 
policy. 
Another ingredient is that the interests of the representatives 
must not be antagonistic to those of other members of the class. 
The mere fact that there are divergent views among the members 
would not, in every instance, preclude the maintenance of the 
action.45 But when the divergence becomes a material considera-
tion, so that the interests of the representatives and the represented 
clash, there is not adequate representation. In Kentucky Home 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duling,46 plaintiff sued for himself and for 
the members of the Postal Employees Society alleging a breach of 
contract of insurance by the change from a uniform premium rate 
to a step-rate and praying for cancellation of the policies. The 
-u Sheets v. Thomann, 336 S.W.2d 701, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) . 
42 Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. 
Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 76 (D. Conn. 1958). 
43 MOORE ,f 23.07, at 3425. 
44 30 F. Supp. 173 (S.D. Ill. 1939). 
45 Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140, 152 (8th Cir. 1944). See also, 
Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 77 (D. Conn. 1958) and Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 
191, 194 (1949). 
46 190 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1951). 
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court denied the use of the class device on the ground that the 
requirement of adequacy of representation was not satisfied for 
the reason that the members of the society did not, in all probabil-
ity, have the same interests as the "representative." Some members 
might have preferred to continue their policies at whatever rates 
might be determined, rather than have their policies canceled and 
be forced to "seek insurance in other companies, possibly with less 
or different benefits or with higher rates.''47 
The mere fact that numbers of persons are being dealt with 
will probably insure some differences of opinions and desires. Yet, 
in the absence of a specific showing of antagonistic interests, either 
by inference from the facts or from affirmative evidence, the courts 
do not permit this obstacle to preclude the use of the remedy. A 
leading decision illustrating the possibility of inferring antagonistic 
interests is Hansberry v. Lee.48 The question confronting the 
Court was whether certain defendants were bound by a ruling in 
previous litigation. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants 
from violating a covenant restricting the use of certain land in 
Chicago to members of the Caucasian race. The bill alleged that 
the covenant was not to become effective unless ninety-five percent 
of the owners signed; plaintiffs claimed the necessary percentage 
had signed; defendants, however, denied this and contended that 
the agreement had never become effective. Plaintiffs then con-
tended that defendants were precluded from raising this issue be-
cause of certain prior litigation in which this issue had been stipu-
lated between the parties. The Supreme Court of Illinois49 held 
that the defendants were precluded from raising the issue, but the 
Supreme Court of the United States reversed on the ground that 
such a foreclosure would violate due process. Holding that the 
group which sought to enforce the covenant was not of the same 
class as those who sought to resist it, the Court said: 
"It is one thing to say that some members of a class may 
represent other members in a litigation where the sole and 
common interest in the litigation, is either to assert a common 
right or to challenge an asserted obligation. . . . It is quite 
47 Id. at 802. 
48 311 U.S. 32 (1940), 21 B.U.L. REv. 132 (1941), 26 CORNELL L.Q. 317 (1941), 29 GEO. 
L.J. 922 (1941), 39 MICH. L. REv. 829 (1941), 89 U. PA. L. REv. 525 (1941), 27 VA, L. REv. 
396 (1941), 26 WASH, U.L.Q. 422 (1941). 
49 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939). 
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another to hold that all those who are free alternatively either 
to assert rights or to challenge them are of a single class, so 
that any group, merely because it is of the class so constituted, 
may be deemed adequately to represent any others of the class 
in litigating their interests in either alternative. Such a selec-
tion of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose sub-
stantial interests are not necessarily or even probably the same 
as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford 
that protection to absent parties which due process requires."50 
Representation obviously cannot be adequate in a case where the 
representatives attempting to enforce the covenant seek to repre-
sent those who desire to resist it. 
One further remark may be made concerning the requisites of 
the class remedy. Although federal rule 23, as well as decisions con-
struing other rules, requires that "common relief"51 be sought, 
modern decisions have expanded the meaning to the point where 
"common relief" means the same kind or type of relief, rather than 
the same relief.52 Both in federal and state courts prior to rule 23-
type language the representatives and the represented had to seek 
the same relief, e.g., an injunction or similar remedy. With the 
introduction of the spurious device this stringent meaning has now 
been necessarily liberalized. Where, therefore, each member of the 
group is entitled to separate relief, such as damages or other 
monies, "common relief" is sought. 
In order to orient the reader to the manifold procedural prob-
lems confronting court and counsel in class actions, a reference 
must be made to the various categories of such actions. As is well 
known, courts, especially in the federal system, have often charac-
terized class suits as "true," "hybrid," and "spurious."53 In Shipley 
50 311 U.S. at 44-45. 
51 This requirement is discussed in 3 MooRE ,r 23.10, at 3455; Gordon, The Common 
Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REv. 518 (1947); 
Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 
874, 931 (1958). • 
52 Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952); McGrath v. Abo, 186 
F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young &: Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944); 
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 88 (7th Cir. 1941); State Wholesale Grocers v. 
Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D- 510, 512 (N.D. III. 1959). Contra, Farmers Co-op. 
Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d IOI (8th Cir. 1942). 
53 3 MooRE ,r 23.08, at 3434; Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 
1952); Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 
136 F. Supp. 125, 135 (N.D. Ill. 1955); Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. 
Cir. 1948); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947). 
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11. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R.54 a true class action was described as an 
action in which a decree will affect the interests of persons too nu-
merous to be made parties; a hybrid as one in which individuals 
having separate rights nevertheless have a common interest in a 
fund or piece of property; and a spurious as a permissive joinder 
device in which the persons have an interest in a common question 
of law or fact requiring adjudication.55 The classification is, there-
fore, dependent upon the jural relations of the members of the 
class, and important results flow from the placing of a class suit in 
any one category. Jurisdictional requirements, the binding effect 
of a judgment, the running of the statute of limitations, the rem-
edy of intervention-all vary with the "type of suit" deemed to 
be involved. 
A. True Class Actions 
The traditional type of class suit is the "true" class action. It 
has been described as "one wherein but for the class device, the 
joinder of all interested persons would be essential."56 Typical 
examples are suits by or against joint stock associations, part-
nerships consisting of many members, or unincorporated associa-
tions;57 stockholders' derivative suits58 and taxpayer actions.59 
Cases such as Smith v. Swormstedt60 involving church organiza-
tions also fall within this category.61 In this leading decision, the 
Supreme Court overruled an objection asserting that the class 
device was not proper where a small number of plaintiffs who 
asserted common rather than individual interests sought to repre-
54 70 F. Supp. 870 (\V .D. Pa. 1947). 
55 Moore seems to say that in a true class suit the joinder of all interested persons is 
essential. 3 MooRE 11 23.08, at 3435. The courts, however, have not seen fit to require this 
stringent a test for the true class suit. Compare the language in Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 
152 F.2d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945); Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870, 874 
(\V.D. Pa. 1947). 
56 3 MooRE , 23.08, at 3435. 
57 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945); 
Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893); Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen, 271 Pa. 419, 114 Atl. 377 (1921). For a comprehensive collection of cases, see 
Brunson, Some Problems Presented by Unincorporated Associations in Civil Procedure, 
7 S.C.L.Q. 394, 396-97 (1955). 
58 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 193, at 334 (1946); 3 MOORE 11 23.08, at 3436. See the 
distinctions between derivative suits and representative suits in Note, 42 IowA L. REv. 
568 (1957). 
59 Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REv. 34, 43 (1937). 
60 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853). 
61 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Bates v. Houston, 66 Ga. 198 
(1880); Hodges v. Nalty, 104 Wis. 464, 80 N.W. 726 (1899). 
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sent some fifteen hundred ministers to enforce rights in a common 
fund. 
In all these situations the fundamental cause of action or de-
fense that exists for each member of the group is common to all 
others; the characters of the rights sought to be enforced or de-
fended are identical, and the few who maintain or defend the 
action "stand in the shoes" of the others so that their interests are 
clearly affected. In maintaining or defending such a suit, sup-
posedly, vigorous action can be expected not merely for the parties 
of record but for all the others as well. Hence, in these situations 
the class device performs the important function of disposing of 
the dispute involving the essential interests of the members of the 
group. 
It is not, of course, always possible to place class suits in nice, 
neat niches, and many courts properly either ignore the classifica-
tion of suits or deprecate the use of such odd terms.62 Because of 
the inherent difficulty of classification, the nomenclature is essen-
tially useless. 63 Many decisions, considering other relevant factors 
such as the "character of the right sought to be enforced, the jural 
relations of the members, the effect of the judgment, the kind of 
liability sought to be imposed, the concept of due process, ... and 
most importantly, judicial convenience,"64 come to a conclusion 
62 Judge Goodrich in Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945), said: 
"It may be admitted that the terminology shocks the aesthetic sense and the succession 
of adjectives before the noun shows the poverty of imagination in choice of terms charac-
teristic of the legal profession.'' 
Professor Chafee once remarked: "It is not uncommon, when a case goes through 
several courts, for one court to call it spurious and another hybrid, and sometimes the 
judges throw up their hands in despair and frankly say they do not know what it is.'' 
CHAFEE, So~!E PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 249 (1950). The difficulty of classification is shown by 
history of Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 108 
F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 3II U.S. 282 (1940), opinion on remand, 39 F. Supp. 592 
(E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941). The district court denominated the bill "a 
class bill"; on appeal, the Third Circuit termed the action "spurious"; the Supreme Court 
did not characterize the action; when remanded, the district court said it was "hybrid" 
and on appeal to the Third Circuit for the second time, that court said, "Names are not 
important.'' 123 F.2d at 983. 
63 CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 62, at 249: "Therefore, Rule 23 (a) would be greatly 
improved, in my opinion, if all the provisions establishing the tripartite division of class 
suits were dropped out, making this part of the rule read as follows: '(a) REPRESENTATION. 
If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them 
all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate repre-
sentation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued.' " Such a rule would then be similar 
to old Equity Rules 38 and 48 and the code provisions. See also Kalven & Rosenfield, 
supra note 13, at 703, 707; Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 13, at 333; Note, 46 
CoLUM. L. REv. 818, 823 (1946); Note, 2 How. L.J. 111, ll6 (1956). 
6~ Note, 2 How. L.J. Ill, ll6 n.32 (1956). 
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without any attempt at classification. In recent civil rights cases 
in the federal tribunals, for example, the courts have reached the 
conclusion that recognition of civil rights is for the benefit of all 
the members of the class, without bothering to denominate the 
enforcement suit as one type or another of class action. In Lucy v. 
Adams65 an action was instituted by certain Negro ~tudents against 
the dean of admissions of the University of Alabama for a declara-
tory judgment and injunction to obtain admission to that univer-
sity. In the course of its opinion the court held that the action was 
properly brought under federal rule 23(a), without plaintiffs or the 
court specifying the particular section and without denominating 
the type of class suit. Nor need this have been done. The identical 
jural relations of the members of the Negro race, the assertion of 
interests of the members of the group to affect the whole group, 
the convenience of deciding the question once instead of innumer-
able times, all were factors which would lead to the application of 
the "true" label, but which were considered by the court without 
the risk of becoming entangled in the web of explicit classification. 
B. Hybrid Class Actions 
In the "hybrid" action numerous persons have individual 
rights; each has a separate and distinct interest which could be 
asserted or defended individually; each would be entitled to sepa-
rate relief, yet each person has an interest in a specific "common" 
fund or property which is to be distributed to all the members of 
the class.116 An example is Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co.67 in 
which two holders of trust investment certificates brought an ac-
tion for the benefit of all holders to establish for the beneficiaries 
an equitable lien upon a surplus in a trust fund over and above 
the surrender value of the certificates. The court held that juris-
65 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala. 1955) . See the excellent discussion of the civil rights 
cases in Comment, Class Actions, A Study of Group-Interest Litigation, 1 RACE REL. L. 
REP. 991 (1956) • 
66 3 MOORE 1 23.09(2) , at 3439. 
67 144 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1944). In Boesenberg v. Chicago Title &: Trust Co., 128 F.2d 
245 (7th Cir. 1942), action was brought on behalf of all beneficiaries of a trust estate 
against the trust company seeking to have restored to the trust estate certain funds 
allegedly wrongfully diverted. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but on appeal this 
holding was reversed. While the issue before the court was whether the several amounts 
could be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of amount in controversy, 
the court held that the class suit was properly brought. This type of class suit has also 
been recognized under code provisions. Guffanti v. National Sur. Co., 133 App. Div. 610, 
118 N.Y. Supp. 207 (1909), afj'd, 196 N.Y. 452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909). 
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dictional facts for a proper class suit were alleged on the grounds 
that the rights were common to all certificate holders. While the 
court did not specify that the action was authorized under federal 
rule 23(a)(2), that portion of the rule properly was applicable in-
asmuch as the rights of the certificate holders were several and each 
holder was interested in a common fund-the surplus.68 
C. Spurious69 Class Actions 
The term "spurious" was probably adopted from Street's 
Federal Equity Practice.70 Street distinguished between only two 
kinds of suits-the "true" and the "spurious." The "true" was one 
affecting a fund or property while the "spurious" was concerned 
with personal liability. Injunction suits were given by him as 
examples. In such cases the rights of the members are several; one 
can sue alone; joinder might be permitted; or one could sue for 
all, seeking a relief which would abate the injury for all. The ob-
ject sought, therefore, was common to all. To Street, "spurious" 
thus had a more restricted meaning than under present usage. 
Under the present-day concept the action envisages two situa-
tions: (1) where the interests of the members of the group are 
several and each member is entitled to, or is seeking, the same 
relief (such as an injunction), and (2) where the interests of the 
members of the group are several and each member is seeking 
separate but similar relief.71 Thus the "spurious" action today is a 
device to permit numerous parties to band together to dispose of 
their multiple interests when they have no affiliation with each 
other save the fact that they are fortuitously interested in common 
questions of law or fact and they seek or are entitled to the same 
general type of relief. Each member of such a group is given a 
choice to maintain an action or intervene in one which another 
has initiated. In the latter case those persons who begin the action 
and all those who intervene then become actual parties and will 
gain or lose by any judgment. But absent parties are not affected 
<18 See also Henn v. City of Clinton, 131 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1942). 
<10 For discussions of this type of suit, see 3 MooRE 11 23.10(3); Comment, 35 CALIF. 
L. R.Ev. 443 (1947); Notes, 46 COLOM, L. REv. 818 (1946), 2 How. L.J. 111 (1956), 53 Nw. 
U.L. R.Ev. 627 (1958), 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472 (1954). 
70 1 STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRAcnCE 342 (1909). 
71 Although Fm. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) uses the term "common relief," the courts have 
interpreted this to mean the same kind of relief. 
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in any way.72 The spurious suit is therefore merely an invitation to 
join and not a "command performance."73 
While the spurious suit has found favor in the federal courts 
and some state courts,7'4 there has been a good deal of doubt as to 
the real nature and function of the device. Unlike the class suit 
it is not based on traditional equitable principles, and historically 
this type of suit was never permitted. Many state courts, in con-
struing their code provisions, refuse to go beyond traditional 
situations, and do not permit the spurious class action.75 Decisions 
have denied the class remedy in cases involving consumer over-
charges, 76 fraud,77 actions to recover refunds,78 and in other situa-
tions.79 
Various reasons have been given for the courts' refusal to ex-
tend the class device to the area where there is no ready existing 
class. Since all the persons who have claims to assert have distinct, 
separate interests, one person cannot "stand in the shoes" of an-
12 Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E.R.R., 7 F.R.D. 744 (W.D. Pa. 1948); 3 MooRE 1f 23.11, 
at 3465. 
73 3 MOORE 1f 23.10, at 3443. 
74 California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947); 
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 
311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); 
McNichols v. Lennox Furance Co., 7 F.R.D. 40 (N.D.N.Y. 1947); McReynolds v. Louis-
ville Taxicab &: Transfer Co., 5 F.R.D. 61 (W.D. Ky. 1942); Fanucchi v. Coberly-West 
Co., 311 P.2d 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 19~7); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill. 2d 
532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959); Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 
472 (1958). 
75 Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 190 P.2d 626 (Cal. App.), afj'd, 
32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948); City of Lakeland v. Chase Nat'l Co., 159 Fla. 
783, 32 So. 2d 833 (1947); Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 
(1944); Kimes v. City of Gary, 224 Ind. 294, 66 N.E.2d 888 (1946); Garfein v. Stiglitz, 260 
Ky. 430, 86 S.W.2d 155 (1935); Thorn v. Hormel &: Co., 206 Minn. 589, 289 N.W. 516 
(1940); Niehaus v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164 S.W.2d 180 
(1942); Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 
25 N.W.2d 908 (Neb. 1947); Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 
282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939); State ex rel. Gerspacher v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio St. 32, 104 
N.E.2d 1 (1952); Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star Co., 72 Ohio St. 112, 73 N.E. 1058 
(1905); Covert v. Nashville, C. &: St. L.R.R., 208 S.W.2d 1008 (Tenn. 1948); Matthews v. 
Landowners Oil Ass'n, 204 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). 
76 Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938). 
77 Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 
(1939); Brenner v. Title Guarantee &: Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937). 
78 Thorn v. Hormel &: Co., 206 Minn. 589, 289 N.W. 516 (1940), 24 MINN. L. REv. 703 
(1940). 
79 E.g., actions by employees to recover overtime compensation, Archer v. Musick, 
147 Neb. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 25 N.W.2d 908 (Neb. 1947); 
Neihaus v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 237 Mo. App. 112, 164 S.W .2d 180 (1942); 
and actions to recover statutory penalties, Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses 
Ass'n, 190 P.2d 626 (Cal. App. 1948), afj'd, 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948). 
1962] CLASS SUITS 921 
other in the assertion of his individual claim or defense. It is 
argued that one person should never have it in his power to liti-
gate another's interest so that the other would be bound in the 
event of an unfavorable determination. To extend the generaliza-
tion of the worth of the class action in traditional type suits to 
the "spurious" class situation would, it is said, violate funda-
mental notions of due process. Not being before the court per-
sonally, and not having himself appointed a representative, the 
non-appearing person cannot be bound by any adverse decision. 
The federal courts, spurred by Professor Moore's analysis and 
treatise, have gone beyond the traditional principles in recogniz-
ing spurious class actions,80 although the committee referred to 
rule 23 as "a substantial restatement of equity rule 38"81 and writ-
ers referred to the rule as "introducing no change of principle in 
respect to class suits."82 State courts too, construing rule 23-type 
language, have sometimes recognized this type of suit.83 In doing 
so, the courts have attempted to extend the traditional rules of class 
actions to solve a multiple party problem involving the several 
rights of individuals where each is entitled to separate relief. Fed-
eral rule 23(a) provides: 
"If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make 
it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of 
them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate repre-
sentation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when 
the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against 
the class is . . . 
"(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact 
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought." 
so California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947); 
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young 8: 
Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941). 
81 Original committee 1937 note to rule 23, 3 MooRE f 23.01, at 3404; AnvisORY 
COMMITIEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT 58 (1937). 
82 CLARK, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES PROCEEDINGS 66 (1938); Sunderland, 
The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 16 (1938); Comment, 6 STAN. L. REv. 120, 
137 (1953). Professor Sunderland said at 16: "The new rule introduces no change of 
principle in respect to class suits, but merely expresses in a simple, intelligible way the 
operating principles by which the courts have been guided in dealing with class suits. 
What the committee tried to do was to specify in this rule all the types of cases in 
which class suits had in fact been authorized, and to state the conditions which the courts 
appeared to consider necessary for instituting class suits.'' 
83 Fanucchi v. Coberly-West Co., 311 P.2d 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Cohon v. 
Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958); Salt Lake City v. Utah Lake 
Farmers Ass'n, 4 Utah 2d 14, 286 P.2d 773 (1955). 
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Under the rule the spurious class suit is a remedy which per-
mits certain individuals who claim individual relief to initiate 
proceedings for and on behalf of others who are then permitted 
to circumvent federal jurisdictional requirements and enter the 
pending litigation to assert their individual claims for relief. The 
only tie that all the individuals need have is a common question 
of law or fact. 
In the federal system, most decisions have denominated this 
type suit a permissive joinder device, 84 a mere invitation to inter-
vene. Intervention must be made at an early stage and is rarely 
permitted after judgment. The orthodox view is expressed in 
Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,85 an action brought by certain 
cotton growers on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 
situated to recover damages for violation of the antitrust laws. 
The court, in denying the plaintiffs' action brought in the class 
form, held that the spurious action is nothing more than a permis-
sive joinder device and that counsel's contention that an interlocu-
tory judgment could be entered and then additional parties al-
lowed to come in finds no justification in any principle of law. 
Although each party is free to assert and defend all issues rela-
tive to the situation as to absentees, any absentee seeking relief 
after judgment must instigate a new and independent action and 
is thus forced to plead, prove and bear the brunt of the whole 
case again; the opposite party, even if he had prevailed before, 
must fully defend anew. In short, an adverse judgment does not 
foreclose those "represented," however numerous, from litigating 
the same issues separately and repetitively. This falls far short of 
solving modern-day problems. The spurious class suit under 
present federal-rule practice presents something of an enigma. If 
the device is merely a permissive joinder remedy which operates 
to enlarge the field of federal jurisdiction there would seem to be 
no need to be concerned with the requirements laid down in the 
rule as to representation and numbers of persons. Furthermore, 
if the only function is to avoid effects of federal jurisdictional lim-
itations, what justification can there be for enactment in state rules 
of a provision patterned after federal rule 23? It would seem that 
84 3 M;ooRE ,I 23.10(3), at 3442; California Apparel Creators v. Weider of Cal., Inc~ 
162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947); Hunter v. Southern Indem. Underwriters, 47 F. Supp. 242 
(E.D. Ky. 1942). 
85 20 F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Cal. 1957) • 
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the spurious class suit is neither a class suit nor a mere permissive 
joinder device. Rather, it is an attempt to provide a remedy to 
dispose of a multiple party problem as efficiently as can be done 
under present rules. 
It has been urged by several courts86 and writers87 that the 
action should be interpreted as more than a mere permissive 
joinder device-as a new and potentially useful, effective proce-
dure to suit modern conditions. Emphasis placed on the "class" 
nature of the proceedings would facilitate a clean disposition of a 
whole situation in a single action. Kalven and Rosenfield, 88 for 
example, have suggested that any decree in the suit should be held 
open to permit claimants to participate in the benefits of a favor-
able decision. Such a suggestion, besides presupposing a decree 
favorable to the class side, would still entail the following addi-
tional steps: (1) the entry of an interlocutory order by the court, 
in favor of the parties plaintiff and those who intervene; (2) a 
reference to a master to administer the details; (3) the preparation 
and submission of proof of claims and a hearing on any objections 
thereto; and (4) the entry of a final decree.89 This general approach 
of allowing intervention after the issues had been closed favorably 
on liability was approved recently in State Wholesale Grocers v. 
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.90 Twenty retail grocers and two whole-
sale grocers in Chicago brought an action against a national grocery 
company for injunctive relief and treble damages under the Clay-
ton Act for certain discriminatory practices. Two and one-half 
years after the proofs had been closed on the issue of liability the 
plaintiffs sought to bring into the action those retail and whole-
sale grocers who would accept an invitation to join. The court 
permitted the plaintiffs to do so and said: "I think the procedures 
utilized in the instant cases demonstrate most effectively the proper 
employment of the Rules and the tools available to a trial court."91 
This decision is a cogent example of what can be accomplished 
so Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942); 
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); Hunter v. Southern Indem. Under-
writers, 47 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ky. 1942). 
87 Keelfe, Levy 8e Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Note, 
46 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 818 (1946). 
88 Kalven 8e Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L 
R.Ev. 684 (1941). 
89 Id. at 693-94. 
90 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
91 Id. at 513. 
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through the use of the existing rules to ease overburdened dockets. 
The class device was invented not only as a matter of necessity 
but also as a matter of convenience and utility. This decision 
holds that the rules do possess to some extent that "quality of 
utility." The original trial tested the legality of the conduct of 
the defendant and found against it-conduct which incontestibly 
was common in its effects upon all persons injured and the fact 
that intervention of the absent persons might take place some time 
after trial did not interpose insuperable obstacles. 
Other proposals have been advanced to make the rule 23(a) 
spurious suit a more effective device by simply foreclosing reliti-
gation of common questions of law or fact by any member of the 
class.92 As to these common issues, e.g., an affirmative finding of 
the liability of the defendant, there would be one trial which 
would be binding upon the defendant which would allow others 
to take advantage of the favorable determination and present their 
claims in subsequent proceedings. This approach was taken in 
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer,93 a libel action instituted 
against several defendants as representatives of two labor unions. 
In the course of the concurring opinion, it was stated: 
"I am satisfied that it legally would be possible to ad ju-
dicate, on the basis of class representation, whether the pub-
lications complained of were in fact union acts; whether they 
were libellous in the circumstances; and, if so, what pecuni-
ary damage had been occasioned to appellant by them. . . . 
Such an adjudication could probably also be made to serve 
as a foreclosure of all questions against the members of the 
union as a group, leaving open only the question in favor of 
each individual, who might subsequently be sued and served 
with summons as a basis for a personal judgment, whether he 
had participated in, authorized or ratified such wrongful acts 
as the union was found to have committed."94 
From these various viewpoints it can be seen that courts and 
writers have not yet reached agreement as to a true and proper 
function for the spurious class suit. Nor is agreement likely to be 
reached while the spurious suit remains tied in concept to the 
92 Note, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 472, 475 (195J). 
93 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948). 
94 Id. at 189-90. See discussion in Note, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472 (1954); see also Pascale 
v. Emery, 95 F. Supp. 147, 149 (D. Mass. 1951). 
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traditional class suit. Until it is removed from that category, 
progress is not likely to be made. 
The doctrines of limitations on the class suit are so ingrained 
in judicial concepts that no amount of interstitial revision of the 
rules would solve the problem of disposing of cases in all the 
situations. What is needed is a new legislative rule which will 
directly authorize solution of these problems and free the new 
remedy from all of the historical limitations of the "class" suit. 
Under this new remedy some individuals who have interests must 
be permitted to initiate a proceeding for and on behalf of all others 
who are similarly situated in order to try, once and for all, the 
common issues of fact and law. After the litigation has been 
begun, notification could be given to all known, and by publica-
tion to all unknown, interested persons to invite them to appear, 
join, consent to, or intervene in the pending suit. If the common 
issues were adjudicated favorably to the representative side, the 
court would have the power to appoint a referee or master to 
determine the individual claims of the various persons and the 
amount of relief to which each personally might be entitled, if any. 
The adversary, before the referee or master, would have the right 
to assert any peculiar defense it might have against the individual 
claimant, but would not be able to relitigate the common issues 
already adjudicated. The claimant would be allowed to present 
his claim to the officer appointed or to the court even after judg-
ment. As to those individuals who took advantage of the oppor-
tunity to present their claims, a pro rata share of the recovery, if 
any, would be allocated to their attorneys' fees and expenses. The 
one litigation would then be res judicata to all those claimants 
who were original parties or who had intervened or submitted 
claims and to the defendants on all the common issues involved. 
By this type of procedure eliminating the "class" concepts, it is 
believed that the courts would not then be faced with the same 
objections that now are faced under the language of the present 
rules and equitable principles. 
Ill. SPECIAL PROCEDURAL PBOBLEMS 
A. Pleading and Proof 
Court and counsel are presented with unique and often per-
plexing procedural problems in the maintenance of a class action. 
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At the outset the pleading must indicate that the suit is a class 
action; otherwise it is maintainable only in one's individual ca-
pacity.95 The suit is not properly in representative form unless it 
, is alleged to be brought on behalf of all others similarly situated. 
Such allegation by itself, however, does not determine that the 
character of the suit is substantively a representative one.00 The 
petition should allege that the class is so large as to make it 
impractical to bring all the members before the court,07 but at 
the same time it should describe the class with some certainty, 
whether the class be plaintiffs or defendants.98 The complaint 
should state facts sufficient to establish the petitioner as represent-
ative within the prevailing rules,99 in order to establish prima 
facie that the petitioners will fairly and adequately represent the 
class.100 
The data to be considered relative to adequacy of representa-
tion should include "any matter which would prove or reasonably 
indicate the lack such an adversary interest on the part of those 
named and served."101 A petition seeking to enjoin the trustees of 
a subdivision from enforcing certain restrictions sufficiently satis-
fied the requirement of adequacy where the petition alleged that 
a meeting of the lot owners was held, that a discussion occurred 
as to what action the group was to take, that the parties were own-
ers of lots in the subdivision, and that their presence insured the 
fair and adequate representation of all the owners.102 , 
Of course, where the petition shows on its face an absence of 
the elements that must be present the petition will not be up-
held.103 The usual form of objection offered to test sufficiency of 
95 Spanner v. Brandt, 1 F.R.D. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
96 Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Reiner, 45 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1942); City of Lakeland 
v. Chase Nat'! Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32 So. 2d 833 (1947). 
97 Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1944); RFC 
v. Teter, ll7 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1941). 
98 City of Lakeland v. Chase Nat'! Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32 So. 2d 833 (1947); Matthews 
v. Landowners Oil Ass'n, 204 S.W .2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). 
99 Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344, 254 P .2d 6 (1953). 
100 Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young &: Co., 3 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Milton Const. & 
Supply Co. v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 308 S.W .2d 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958). 
Although the federal rules authorize "notice pleading" it has been held that in class 
suits more facts should be alleged than in ordinary cases. Baim &: Blank, Inc. v. Warren-
Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
101 Sheets v. Thomann, 336 S.W .2d 701, 7ll (Mo. Ct. App. 1960), 
102 Ibid. 
103 Gray v. Reuther, 99 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mich. 1951). 
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the petition as a class action is the motion to dismiss, 104 although 
this is not listed as one of the grounds in rule 12 of the federal 
rules. But both a motion for judgment on the pleadings105 and a 
motion to strike106 also have been used successfully to test the 
pleadings. 
Not only must the pleadings be sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments for a class suit, but the proofs likewise must be so. In 
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co.101 a civil action by jobbers of gasoline to 
recover damages under the antitrust laws, the court, discussing the 
quantum of proof necessary to establish satisfaction of the repre-
sentative requirements, suggested that this requirement might 
have been met if further facts had been adduced. If plaintiffs had 
shown that the recoverable damages would have been the same 
under all the various contracts, that damages were suffered as a 
result of the defendant's price increase, that others in the class 
desired this suit ( or at least that they knew of few or no instances 
where members of the class were opposed to the suit), and that 
notice by letter or newspaper could have been given to the repre-
sented jobbers, 108 then the requirement of representation would 
have been satisfied. 
Although the procedural rules contain no explicit variations 
for the three types of class suits relative to pleading and proof of 
the fact of "adequate representation,"109 the standard in the spu-
rious-suit case must in this respect be less stringent and exacting 
than in those cases where the group might enjoy some bond of 
association or community of interest. By definition in the spurious 
suit there will be no persons "similarly situated" in the same sense 
as in the other type cases. "Representatives" will not represent 
in the same sense, as each interest will be separate, although against 
the common adversary. One cannot adequately represent another 
104 Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Coxhead v. Winsted Hardware 
Mfg. Co., 4 F.R.D. 448 (D. Conn. 1945); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young &: Co., 3 F.R.D. 
220 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Hunter v. Southern Indem. Underwriters, 47 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. 
Ky. 1942). 
105 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945). 
106 Saxton v. W. S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519 (N.D. Ga. 1940). 
107 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941). 
108 Id. at 94. See also discussion in Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D. 
385, 394 (D. Neb. 1947). 
109 Fm. R. CIV. P. 23(a) provides: "If persons constituting a class are so numerous 
••• such of them ••• as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may •••• " 
(Emphasis added.) 
928 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
in the assertion or defense of details of his individual claim. A, 
injured in a disaster, cannot under traditional standards "ade-
quately represent" B, who may have sustained personal injuries 
in the same disaster, as to any issues, and A's action for damages 
is not made binding by the rule as to any other injured person 
who does not become a party in A's proceeding. All that can be 
shown and all that can be required in such suits if they are to 
be authorized is that the "reprentatives" are similarly situated be-
cause of identity of issues. Recognizing the realities of the situation, 
the court in Oppenheimer v. F. ]. Young & Co.U0 placed less strin-
gent requirements of adequacy of representation on the spurious 
action because the judgment would not be binding on those who 
were "represented."111 Because of these considerations, the mean-
ing of allegations of adequate representation is that there is a basis 
for a court finding of the propriety of the representative proce-
dure, under assurance of a fair and adequate presentation of the 
common issues in the proceeding. 
B. Discovery 
In class suits, pre-trial conferences, special interrogatories, and 
demands for documents and admissions could be effectively uti-
lized in order both to simplify the issues and to determine the pro-
priety of representation by reference to the number of persons 
involved and the differences in views, if any, within the alleged 
class. But, as suggested by the materials in the appendix, they 
seem not to have been extensively employed. In one case, for 
example, general depositions were used to establish the nature of 
the defendant's business, but were limited to that issue.112 
The pre-trial conference under modern rules 113 has sometimes 
been used effectively in large representative suits.114 Clark v. 
United States115 strikingly illustrates what can be accomplished 
through pre-trial conferences. In 1948 the Columbia River broke 
through an embankment on ground owned by the United States 
and flooded the city of Vanport, Oregon, causing widespread dam-
110 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944). 
111 Id. at 390. 
112 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945). 
113 FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
114 Clark v. United States, 13 F.R.D. 342 (D. Ore. 1952); Womack v. Consolidated 
Timber Co., 43 F. Supp. 625 (D. Ore. 1941). See discussion of the Clark case in Seminar 
on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 385 (1959). 
115 13 F.R.D. 342 (D. Ore. 1952). 
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age. Out of three thousand claims filed against the United States 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act twenty cases were selected for 
initial trial. Extremely complicated issues of law were involved. 
especially as to liability, and multitudes of fact details would re-
quire proof, especially as to damages. In pre-trial conferences or-
dered by the court, attorneys reached agreement on various issues, 
resulting in a pre-trial order which occupied sixty-one pages in 
the report. The order consisted of first, a statement of facts, sec-
ond, a statement of the contentions of the parties as to the facts 
and law, third, a statement of the issues of fact and law as agreed 
upon by the attorneys, and fourth, a list of all the documents 
which either party might introduce. Thus the issues were sharply 
drawn, much trial time was saved, and undoubtedly the trial was 
simplified. 
It is in just such cases as this that the remedy proposed herein 
would operate. One action instead of three thousand could be 
used to determine the liability issues common to all plaintiffs 
against the defendant; subsequently, if the defendant was held 
liable a master could be appointed to determine outside of court 
amounts of individual damages, thus relieving the court of the 
undue burden of such details. In fact, in this whole process the 
ancillary proceedings could be supervised by special masters ap-
pointed for the purpose of taking testimony relative to the indi-
vidual claims and making initial findings and recommendations 
respecting any special defenses asserted by the defendant.116 Jury 
trial, if demanded, would be held once on the common issues, but 
not repetitively for the individual claims. Judgment would deter-
mine liability once and for all, thus making unnecessary constant 
re-uttering of evidence and parading of witnesses. Parties affected 
could be notified and allowed to present their claims before the 
master within a reasonable time specified by the court. 
C. Service of Process and ]urisdiction117 
When an action is brought against a class, the general principle 
is that service of process upon representatives of the class is suffi-
116 Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 452, 465-69 
(1958); Marsh, Pre-Trial Discovery in an Anti-Trust Case, 8 REcoRD OF N.C.B.A. 401 (1953); 
Weinstein, Standing Masters To Supervise Discovery, 23 F.R.D. 36 (1959). · 
117 Brunson, Some Problems Presented by Unincorporated Associations in Civil Pro-
cedure, 7 S.C.L.Q. 394, 411 (1955); Kaplan, Suits Against Unincorporated Associations 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53 MICH. L. REv. 945, 948 (1955). 
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dent to give the court in personam jurisdiction over the class. As 
has been said elsewhere, "the criterion as to the sufficiency of serv-
ice in a class suit is whether or not the service of process in ques-
tion constitutes adequate notice to the class sued to come in and 
defend.''118 
A decision often cited is Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Firemen,119 in which the question of the sufficiency of service 
on the chairman of a subordinate lodge was raised. The court, 
relying on the relationship involved, held that the brotherhood 
was given reasonable notice by service on the representative. 
More unique questions were presented in White v. Quisen-
berry.120 Plaintiff sought damages for assault and battery from cer-
tain defendants, both individually and as representatives of a local 
union, alleging that the assault was committed by the individual 
defendants while acting within the scope of their employment for 
the union. The defendants moved to dismiss in so far as the 
complaint attempted to assert a claim against the union, on the 
ground that the union, being an unincorporated association, was 
not subject to suit in the state courts. The motion was overruled 
and service on the representative individuals was held to be effec-
tive service on the members of the union as a class. It would ap-
pear, however, that any judgment for damages obtained might 
under existing precedents well prove uncollectible from union 
funds if the union itself was not a party. Could judgment against 
the defendant class bind personally for damages the individual 
members represented but not personally served? It has been sug-
gested that no such service could be an effective basis for adjudg-
ing personal liability of those represented: 
"No one has ever previously believed ... that a federal court 
was entitled, on the basis of class representation alone, to 
enter a personal judgment of pecuniary liability against an 
individual who was in no other manner being brought into 
-court. "121 
118 Malamey v. Upholsterers' Union, 7 F.R.D. 403, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See Under• 
wood v. Maloney, 14 F.R.D. 222 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Allain v. National R.R. Adjustment Bd., 
120 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Ill. 1953). 
119 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945), cited with approval in Graham v. Brotherhood of 
Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949). 
120 14 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1953), 7 OKLA. L. REv. 232 (1954). 
121 Judge Johnsen in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 
1948). 
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The facts of this case present well the problem of acquiring 
jurisdiction in personam over the absent individuals even of a 
"true" class in their personal capacity. Although the federal rule 
presumably allows service of process on representative defendants 
in any type of class suit, it is difficult to believe that service on 
representative defendants in a spurious suit could be held effective 
to impose a personal judgment for damages upon the absent "rep-
resented" persons under traditional notions of due process. 
Where defendant service has been held effective in the tradi-
tional class suit in the absence of a common name statute,122 suit 
has been required to be alleged to be brought against the served 
individuals as representatives of the association.123 Service should 
be made upon the person designated by statute,124 if any, and 
othen'lise upon such person or persons as will prima facie insure 
the adequate representation of the members of the group and 
adequately give notice to the class and afford it an opportunity to 
defend. If care is taken to serve the process upon persons fairly 
representative of the members of the group, service will be effec-
tive for some purposes at least.125 
D. Standing To Sue 
Questions sometimes arise whether an association has a stand-
ing to sue as a real party in interest. If the association itself has 
no direct interest in the litigation then it is clear that it cannot 
maintain the action, since it is not the real party in interest. In 
California Apparel Creators v. Wieder,126 an unincorporated trade 
association and seventy-five of its members sought to enjoin the 
defendants from using the name "California" in relation to its 
wearing apparel and to recover damages for unfair competition. 
The organization, it was held, did not have a standing to sue, since 
122 At common law and in the absence of statute the unincorporated association 
could not be sued in its common name. Communications ·workers v. Brown, 252 S.W .2d 
103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Bloom v. National Fed'n, 35 T.L.R. 50 (Ct. App. 1918); Brunson, 
supra note 117. 
123 If, however, the unincorporated association is sued to enforce a substantive right 
existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States then it may be sued in the 
common name under rule 17(b). UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) which 
authorized suit against the entity was the subject of some debate in an attempt to limit 
the decision to the Sherman Act. See discussion in Kaplan, supra note 117, at 946-48. 
124 Various statutes are collected in Brunson, supra note 117, at 416. 
125 Canuel v. Oskoian, 23 F.R..D. 307 (D.R .. !. 1959). 
126 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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it had no direct interest in enjoining such practices. So also in 
Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 127 
two former employees of the defendant airline and a voluntary 
unincorporated labor organization brought an action alleging that 
by discharging certain dispatchers defendant had breached a col-
lective bargaining agreement. The court held that the union 
would have to be dismissed because it did not seek any relief for 
itself. 
Where, however, the association has a pecuniary interest in 
preventing a diversion of trade from its members, 128 or where a 
labor organization itself is seeking recovery for the breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement, it has the proper standing to 
maintain the action.129 
E. Venue-Federal 
In actions based on other than federal rights the general venue 
statute is applicable, 130 and accords no special treatment to the 
class action. In diversity cases, therefore, the action should be 
brought in the district of the named plaintiffs or the district of 
the named defendants. The general principle is recognized in 
Carolina Gas. Ins. Co. v. Local 612,131 an action against a local 
union and eight individuals who were officers and members of the 
local. The defendants were sued "as the representatives of a class 
composed of the International Union ... and its members ... as 
parties defendant." One of the defendants moved to dismiss the 
action against him on the ground of nonresidency, accompanying 
the motion with an affidavit attesting to his nonresidence in the 
district. The court granted his motion just as it would have had 
to in a non-class action, stating, "None of the venue statutes accord 
different treatment to a class action than is accorded to non-class 
actions. " 132 
127 127 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Cal. 1954). 
12s Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nieren-
berg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
120 UAW v. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 119 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ill. 1950). 
130 3 MooRE ,I 23.14, at 3486; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in 
the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 933 (1958). 28 U.S.C. § 139l(a) (1958) provides: 
"A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except 
as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs 
or all defendants reside." As to stockholders' actions, see discussion in 3 MOORE ,r 23.21[3], 
at 3534-44; Note, 39 VA. L. REv. 512 (1953). 
131 136 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ala. 1956). 
132 Id. at 943. 
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In actions based on federal rights the proper venue is either 
the principal place of business of the association or the place 
where the federal right was violated if the association has a regu-
lar place of business there. Sperry Prods. v. Association of Amer-
ican Railroads133 involved an action for patent infringement 
against an unincorporated association. Under the venue statute,184 
which provided that the proper venue was "in the district of 
which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which 
the defendant ... shall have committed acts of infringement and 
have an established place of business," the court held that the asso-
ciation might be sued in either place, as it might in a non-class suit. 
F. Control of Suit 
In the absence of a specific rule otherwise, the original parties 
who bring the action have absolute control of the suit so that they 
may dismiss or settle without permission of the court.135 
"One who brings a suit ... holds and retains absolute 
dominion over it unless the court orders otherwise upon find-
ings made after hearing that it is not being prosecuted in 
good faith, with vigor and reasonable capacity. There can 
be but one master of litigation for the plaintiffs. The original 
plaintiffs assumed the burden of prosecuting the cause to a 
conclusion and the liability to costs if defeated. It would be 
impracticable to permit litigation in these circumstances to 
be conducted by the independent action of several plaintiffs 
acting without harmony and according to divergent ideas as 
to the establishment of the liability of the defendant. This is 
the general rule supported by many authorities."136 
Exceptions are carved out of the plaintiff's freedom where a 
contrary court order or decree has been entered, 137 or where per-
sons have been allowed to intervene.188 The intervenor, however, 
133 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942), discussed in 3 MooRE 1f 17.25, at 1415. 
134 36 Stat. 1100, § 48 (1911). Today 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1958) applies and provides: 
"Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where 
the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and 
has a regular and established place of business." 
135 Schatte v. International Alliance, 183 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1950); Wheaton, Repre-
sentative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 423 (1934); Note, 34 
CoLUM. L. REV. 118, 123 (1934); Note, 5 WYO. L.J. 126 (1951); Annot., 91 A.L.R. 587 (1934). 
136 Hallett v. Moore, 282 Mass. 380, 388, 185 N.E. 474, 478 (1933). 
137 Catron v. Bostic, 123 Va. 355, 96 S.E. 845 (1918). 
138 Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron 8: Steel Co., 46 Fed. 336 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1891). 
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cannot introduce foreign, antagonistic or extrinsic issues into the 
litigation and must take the case as he finds it.139 A recent federal 
decision indicates that these principles are based on orderly pro-
cedure in the conduct of litigation. In Schatte v. International Al-
liance140 action was brought by certain individuals on behalf of 
themselves and two thousand others for damages arising out of 
loss of employment. One of the twenty-six named plaintiffs had 
:filed a petition for rehearing. The other twenty-five, represented 
by another attorney, considered it not in their best interests to file 
such a petition. The case arose on a motion to substitute another 
attorney for the one plaintiff. In denying the motion, the court 
relied on the general principle that under orderly procedure the 
original party representing others "retains control over the action 
as opposed to other members of the class who may later seek to 
intervene. "141 
The federal rules, and the state rules based thereon, have now 
placed additional restrictions on control of the class suit. Federal 
rule 23(c) provides that no action shall be dismissed without court 
approval and keys notice thereof to rule 23(a).142 If the action is 
a true class action, notice of dismissal or compromise must be 
given to the members of the class. In the other types of so-called 
class suits notice shall be given only if the court requires it. The 
rule, however, applies only to voluntary, not to involuntary, dis-
missals.143 
There can be no doubt that the general principle permitting 
control of the litigation by those who initiate action is necessary. 
It is usually the only practical choice. But the present restrictions 
relative to notice before dismissal now prevent a class suit from 
being dismissed without notice to the absentees; such a restriction 
is essential and practical where binding effect is intended on ab-
sentees. It is doubtful, however, that the same reason for excep-
1so Hallett v. Moore, 282 Mass. 380, 185 N.E. 474 (1933). 
140 183 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1950). 
141 Id. at 687. 
142 "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of 
the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of sub-
division (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given 
to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If the right is one 
defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given only if the court 
requires it." 
143 Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1940); Cross v. Oneida 
Paper Prods. Co., 117 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1954). 
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tion applies to the spurious suit if the action is not a "class" ac-
tion, in the sense that absentees are not bound, and if the action 
is a mere permissive joinder device. 
G. Diversity of Citizenship 
Questions often arise in class suits in the federal system because 
of the diversity of citizenship limitation. The question is whether 
the citizenship of each of the members of the class is to be taken 
into consideration so that, if some are citizens of the same state 
as the adversary, the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtis144 would apply. 
If diversity as to all members of the class and the adversary were 
required, federal courts would cease to be a forum on grounds 
of diversity for many class actions. Accordingly, so far as diversity 
is concerned, the absent members of the class are disregarded, and 
if diversity exists between named parties, the jurisdictional re-
quirement is satisfied.145 
The leading decision applying the general principle is Su-
preme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble.146 There the Court, recog-
nizing the impracticability of bringing together many thousands 
of persons who resided in many different states, allowed the use 
of the class-suit device when there "was the requisite diversity of 
citizenship to justify the bringing of a class suit."147 Where there 
is no diversity, however, between the parties of record, the federal 
court lacks jurisdiction.148 
144 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
145 Fitzgerald v. Dillon, 92 F. Supp. 681, 682 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). See also Zelley v. Mueh-
leck, IO F.R.D. 62, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Malarney v. Upholsterers' Union, 7 F.R.D. 403, 
405 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Moreschi v. Mosteller, 28 F. Supp. 613, 617 (W.D. Pa. 1939); 3 MooRE 
1[ 23.13, at !1485; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 
71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 933 (1958). In jurisdictions which forbid class suits against unin• 
corporated associations, federal rule 17(b) has been held to be determinative so that 
citizenship of all the members of the class determines diversity. In Underwood v. Maloney, 
256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1958), the plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania brought action 
against the president of an international, a resident of Illinois, seeking injunctive relief 
to prevent the enforcement of an order removing him as president of a local. The court 
held that it did not have jurisdiction since capacity to be sued is determined by state 
law. Since some of the members of the class were citizens of the same state as the 
plaintiff, no jurisdiction existed. Such a decision precludes federal jurisdiction but is 
sought to be justified in Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 559 (1959). 
146 225 U.S. 356 (1920). 
141 Id. at 364. 
148 Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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H. A mount in Controversy 
The amount in controversy, while rarely an issue in state 
courts,149 is often determinative of jurisdiction in the federal tri-
bunals.150 Long before the classification of class actions the aggre-
gation problem in class suits was considered.151 The general prin-
ciple, observed as long ago as 1891 in Clay v. Field,152 is dependent 
upon the separability of interests. If the interests of several persons 
are distinct and joined merely for the sake of convenience, the 
rights or liabilities "cannot be aggregated together"153 for the 
purpose of giving the court jurisdiction. But if their interests are 
undivided, though separable among themselves, the amount of 
their joint claim will be the test of jurisdiction. Thus, where the 
character of the right sought is one in common among all the 
members of the class, the determinative jurisdictional amount is 
the total amount sought. In Boesenberg v. Chicago Title and Trust 
Co.,154 suit was brought by one person as representative of all bene-
ficiaries of a trust estate against the trustee, seeking to have certain 
trust funds, alleged to have been diverted, restored to the trust es-
tate. The court of appeals held that since the action sought sums in 
excess of the jurisdictional amount, the subject of the controversy 
was not the recovery of the plaintiff's interest (which was less than 
the jurisdictional amount) but the "protection, preservation and 
administration of a trust estate worth far more than $3,000."150 
In true class actions, therefore, the claims of all members of 
the class may be aggregated for the purpose of obtaining the requi-
149 Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 
(1948). 
150 See 3 MooRE ,i 23.13; Note, 39 ILL. L. REv. 178 (1944); 35 VA. L. REv. 510 (1949); 
Annots., 141 A.L.R. 569 (1942); 81 L. Ed. 189 (1936). 
151 Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Representative Suits, 15 MINN. L. REv. 501 (1931). 
152 138 U.S. 464 (1891). 
153 Id. at 480. "While the cited case was concerned with the jurisdictional amount 
on appeal to the Supreme Court, the principle applies with full effect to . • • the 
trial courts." Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Del. 1949). 
154 128 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942). 
155 Id. at 246. In Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942) the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the use of that name by the 
defendants. Since the plaintiffs had a common cause of action, though separable among 
themselves, the amount of the joint claim was held to be the test of jurisdiction. Exam• 
pies of "true" suits where the amount involved is the character of the right sought to 
be enforced are Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95 (1939); 
see Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REv. 34, 47 (1937). In hybrid 
class suits it is said that the amounts cannot be aggregated. Note, 39 ILL. L. REv. 178, 
179 (1944). 
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site jurisdictional amount, while in the hybrid or spurious class 
suit, the claims may not be aggregated-each claim must be of the 
jurisdictional amount in order for the federal court to take juris-
diction.156 This rule for spurious suits dates back to Pinel v. 
Pinel,151 which forbade aggregation since the demands were "sepa-
rate and distinct."158 The rule has been upheld in spurious actions 
to recover damages for breach of sales contracts,159 to recover vaca-
tion pay of discharged employees,100 to enforce rights under a pen-
sion plan,161 to recover damages for fraud,162 and to recover dam-
ages for wrongful discharge.163 Two decisions arising out of the 
termination of the War Damage Corporation are often cited. In 
Knowles v. War Damage Corp.,164 a husband and wife sought an 
accounting of funds collected as premiums to insure against prop-
erty damage by enemy action. The interests of the plaintiffs 
amounted to only 18 dollars but some 300,000,000 dollars had 
been collected from various policy holders, and the question was 
which amount involved was properly in controversy. The court 
held the interests of the plaintiff and of "represented" persons 
were several so that they could not be aggregated to attain the 
"jurisdictional threshold."165 Although in Matlaw Corp. v. War 
Damage Corp.166 the plaintiffs sought to impress a trust upon the 
funds, this action fared no better because the rights of the parties 
still were several and distinct as to amount in controversy. 
156 Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., supra note 154, at 960: "It is well settled that 
in a 'true' class action in the federal courts, whether jurisdiction is based upon diversity 
of citizenship or upon a federal question arising under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, the claims of all the members of the class may be aggregated for the 
purpose of obtaining the requisite jurisdictional amount. On the other hand, if the 
action is either a 'hybrid' class suit under Rule 23(a)(2) or a 'spurious' class suit under 
Rule 23(a)(3), then the claims of the several members of the class may not be aggregated 
to determine the jurisdictional amount, but rather the claim of each party-plaintiff must 
at least equal the requisite jurisdictional amount specified in the statute in order for the 
court to have jurisdiction as to him." 
157 240 U.S. 594 (1916). 
158 Id. at 596. 
159 Coxhead v. Winsted Hardware Mfg. Co., 4 F.R.D. 448 (D. Conn. 1945). 
160 Long v. Dravo Corp., 6 F.R.D. 226 (W.D. Pa. 1946). 
161 Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 199 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1952). 
162 Miller v. National City Bank, 166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1948). 
163 Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. California E. Airways, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. 
Cal. 1954). 
104 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 
165 Id. at 19. It could be argued that this is a hybrid suit since the rights were 
several and there is specific property involved, but the court said that it would not 
matter that the action might be designated a class action under rule 23(a)(2) or (3). 
166 7 F.R.D. 349 (S.D. Ind. 1947). 
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These results curtail the efficiency of the spurious suit. To 
carry federal rule 23 into effective operation so that the purpose 
of the rule would be accomplished, either the rule should be 
amended to provide for aggregation in all types of class actions or 
the spurious class suit should be omitted from rule 23 and special 
provisions be made to govern it. In neither Knowles nor Matlaw 
was a decision obtained on the merits. It is submitted that the 
result is unsatisfactory, however technically justifiable. 
I. Statute of Limitations161 
Since in the traditional, as distinguished from the "spurious," 
class suit persons represented are bound by the decision, the stat-
ute of limitations is tolled as to all the members of the class at 
the time of the commencement of the action.168 The first judicial 
pronouncement to this effect was Richmond v. Irons.169 There a 
bill was filed by a judgment creditor of an insolvent national bank 
praying that a receiver be appointed and that the proceeds be 
applied to the payment of the plaintiff's debt. A question arose 
as to whether relief should be limited to those persons who became 
parties prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The 
Court refused to exclude any person merely because of late filing, 
stating, "if he proves himself to be a creditor with a valid claim 
against the bank, he becomes a complainant by relation to the 
time of the filing of the bill."170 
Justification can be made for tolling the statute of limitations 
in the "true" and "hybrid" type suits inasmuch as the absentees 
are virtually represented in the action either as to the subject 
matter or as to the fund or property involved. But whether the 
statute of limitations is tolled upon the commencement of a spu- · 
rious class suit is uncertain. Language in some decisions171 indicates 
167 Keeffe, Levy&: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 339 (1948); 
Wheaton, supra note 135, at 423; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the 
Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 942 (1958); Note, 34 CoLUM. L. REv. 118, 127 (1934). 
168 3 MooRE ,i 23.12, at 3476. 
169 121 U.S. 27 (1887). 
110 Id. at 52. The same rule applied not only to creditors: cases collected in Note, 
34 CoLUM. L. REv. 118, 130 (1934); but also to stockholders: Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 
N.Y. 185, 1 N.E. 663 (1885); and taxpayers suits: Coyne v. City of Yonkers, 57 Misc. 366, 
109 N.Y. Supp. 625 (Sup. Ct. 1908). 
171 York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other 
grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 
F.R.D. 155, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Judge Frank in the York case at 529 said: "As to suits 
under (3), no less than those under (1) or (2), the Rule unequivocally tells all persons 
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that one of the uses of this device is the tolling of the statute to 
permit other members of the group to intervene after the statute 
has run. However, in the recent decision of Athas v. Day172 this 
view was not followed. Action for damages for violations in selling 
securities without proper registration was filed by five plaintiffs, 
for themselves and all others similarly situated. An amended com-
plaint added three additional parties after the statute of limita-
tions had run. The court held that they could not be added since 
the action was a spurious class suit which "involves separate causes 
of action, and is a matter of efficiency to avoid multiplicity of ac-
tions. Consequently, each plaintiff must be able to avoid the bar 
of the statute of limitations without reference to the other causes 
of action."173 
This decision is consistent with the present concepts of the 
spurious action, although the rules rela1ing to class actions them-
selves make no such distinction. Of course, this limitation further 
curtails the effectiveness of the spurious-type suit. The principle 
applied in Athas must be right so long as a person who did not 
take advantage of the "invitation to join" the original litigation 
would not be foreclosed by it. 
J. Intervention 
Intervention is intertwined with the principles of res judicata, 
control of the litigation, and jurisdictional requirements; hence 
these principles play an important part in the effectiveness of the 
class remedy. 
Unknown under the organic common law,174 the device of 
having claims of the type therein described that one or more of them may begin such 
a class action 'on behalf of all' when the 'class' is 'so numerous as to make it imprac-
ticable to bring them all before the court.' Any non-accepting noteholders, relying on 
that assurance, were justified in believing that plaintiff's suit was begun on their behalf 
although they were not before the court. To hold that such noteholders cannot, as to 
lapse of time, have the benefit, by intervention, of the institution of the suit by plaintiff 
would be to convert the Rule into a trap. Since, in a class suit under clause (3), a 
judgment will not be res judicata for or against those of the class who do not intervene, 
we suggest that if, after trial, the court finds against the defendant, appropriate steps be 
taken to notify all such noteholders to intervene ••. judgment to be entered in favor 
only of those who do so within a reasonable time.'' 
172 161 F. Supp 916 (D. Colo. 1958). 
173 Id. at 919. 
174 2 CHITIY, GENERAL PRACTICE 493-94 (1835). Intervention is the product of the 
continental system, and to some extent equity. See discussion in 4 MooRE 1J 24.03. 
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intervention was relatively recently adopted in both the- state175 
and federal courts.176 Rule 24 of the federal rules governs inter-
vention in the federal courts.177 
The proper procedure for intervening is set forth in federal 
rule 24(c). The applicant is required to serve upon all the other 
parties his petition or motion to intervene, accompanied by a 
pleading setting forth the claim or defense upon which interven-
tion is sought. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum 
Corp.118 contains the most explicit discussion of the proper pro-
cedure: leave of the court should be obtained to file the peti-
tion, 179 but: 
"The mere filing of the petition pursuant to leave does 
not make the petitioner a party to the cause. The original 
parties are entitled to be heard on the question of his admis-
sion, and, upon filing his petition, he should obtain an order 
of notice to them and have the petition set down for a hearing 
.... The hearing upon the petition should be followed by 
an order denying or granting leave to the petitioner to inter-
vene and become a party . . . . After a petitioner becomes a 
party, he stands to all intents and purposes as if he had been 
an original party to the suit."180 
The federal rules provide for two types of intervention-inter-
vention as of right and permissive intervention. Permissive inter-
175 CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 65, 420-23 (1947). 
176 Prior equity rule 37, 226 U.S. Appendix 11 (1912), provided: "Anyone claiming 
an interest in the litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by inter• 
vention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the 
propriety of the main proceeding." 
177 "(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted 
to intervene in the action: (I) when a statute of the United States confers an uncondi-
tional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by 
existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a 
judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected 
by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to 
the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof. 
"(b) PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to 
intervene in an action: . • . (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main 
action have a question of law or fact in common • . . . In exercising its discretion 
the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the rights of the original parties." 
178 280 Fed. 934 (D. Del. 1922). 
179 This is no longer a requirement under rule 24, although some courts require a 
notice. Cowan v. Tipton, I F.R.D. 694 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); In re Finger Lakes Land Co., 
29 F. Supp. 50 r,'f .D.N.Y. 1939). 
1so 280 Fed. 934, 937 (D. Del. 1922). 
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vention is a matter largely in the discretion of the court. It is 
possible only when the applicant's claim or defense and the main 
action have a question of law or fact in common; factors of delay, 
complication of issues, and prejudice to the original parties may 
bear upon the court's exercise of its discretion.181 
In the cases of intervention as of right, the discretion on the 
part of the court is extremely limited. If the various conditions 
set forth in rule 24 are satisfied the court will be bound to permit 
intervention. This type of intervention "serves a protective func-
tion for the applicant who may be injured unless heard in the 
action. Out of fairness to the applicant, considerations of pro-
cedural efficiency and of inconvenience to the original parties are 
prohibited from influencing the decisions as to intervention of 
right."182 These requirements under rule 24(a), so far as they 
pertain to class actions, were judicially stated in Farmland Irri-
gation Co. v. Dopplmaier:183 
"Essential to an absolute right of intervention in accord-
ance with Rule 24(a) is a showing by the applicant for inter-
vention of the existence of both conditions stated by the Rule, 
i.e., inadequate representation by existing parties and a judg-
ment that is or may be binding in the action. A showing that 
an applicant for intervention will be bound by a judgment 
in the action is not in itself sufficient to confer upon such ap-
plicant a right to intervene; it must also be shown that repre-
sentation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or 
may be inadequate."184 
The above requirement of "inadequacy" of representation 
before intervention is allowed under rule 24 does not quite square 
with the provisions of rule 23. Under rule 23 adequacy of repre-
sentation must be shown before the class suit may be maintained. 
"If it is a proper class action under rule 23, he is by definition 
adequately represented."185 It is possible however, that the in-
181 Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141 (1944); 
First Congregational Church v. Evangelical & Reformed Church, 21 F.R.D. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 
1958); Kind v. Markham, 7 F.R.D. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Crosby Steam Gauge & Valve Co. 
v. Manning, 51 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D. Mass. 1943). 
182 Note, 63 YALE L.J. 408, 409 (1954). 
183 220 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1955). 
18~ Id. at 248. 
185 Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAR.v. 
L. REV. 874, 941 (1958). 
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tended intervenor may be able to add facts which were not brought 
forth originally, and that he may therefore be able to show that 
there is inadequacy of representation. Two decisions have dis-
cussed the problem. In Bisanz Bros. v. Chicago-M. St. P. & P. 
R.R.,186 and Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier,181 it was held 
that inadequacy of representation can be established "if there is 
proof of collusion between the representative and an opposing 
party, if the representative has or represents some interest adverse 
to that of the petitioner, or fails because of non-feasance in his 
duty of representation."188 In such instances rule 24 would be 
satisfied and intervention presumably allowed. 
The second portion of the requirement in rule 24(a)(2), that 
the intervenor may be bound by a judgment, has received varied 
treatment by the courts.189 A number of decisions have strictly 
equated "being bound" with being foreclosed under the doctrine 
of res judicata.190 A less stringent interpretation of "being bound," 
however, is shown in the recent decision of Clark v. Sandusky,191 
in which certain Negro citizens in Illinois sought damages and an 
injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their 
right of occupancy in an apartment in Cicero, Illinois. Mrs. De-
Rose sought to intervene in the action, alleging that she was the 
landlord of the apartment house and that she had an interest in 
the furniture that was sought to be moved into the apartment. 
She sought damages against the plaintiffs and defendants because 
her building had been damaged and her furniture destroyed. The 
trial court denied her petition for intervention; but the appellate 
court, permitting her to intervene as of right, held that while a 
judgment would not be res judicata as to her, "she will be . . . 
unduly prejudiced by that judgment."192 Just how Mrs. DeRose 
would have been prejudiced, inasmuch as no obstacles prevented 
186 20 F.R.D. 353 (D. Minn. 1957). 
187 220 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1955). 
188 Bisanz Bros. v. Chicago M. St. P. &: Pac. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D. Minn. 1957). 
In Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1944), intervention was allowed because of 
inadequate representation. 
189 See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 408 (1954). 
190 Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961), 50 CALIF. L. REv. 
89 (1962) (critical); Sutphen Estates v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951); Durkin v. Pet 
Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 374 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Owen v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 41 F. Supp, 
557 (S.D. Cal. 1941). 
101 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953). 
192 Id. at 918. 
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her from maintaining an independent action against the parties, 
was not explained. If such a liberal interpretation of being bound 
is uniformly given, the trial courts may come to be required to 
allow the interjection into pending litigation of some issues which 
might be more expeditiously and justly handled in separate pro-
ceedings. 
When an applicant seeks to intervene in the federal courts, 
the question arises whether the intervenor must have independent 
jurisdictional grounds. The leading decision holding that the 
intervenor need not satisfy jurisdictional requirements is Stewart 
v. Dunham.193 A creditors' bill was filed in a state court; after 
removal to the federal tribunal, the court permitted certain other 
persons to intervene as parties. It was contended that there was 
no federal jurisdiction because the controversy did not then ap-
pear to be wholly between citizens of different states. The Su-
preme Court rejected this contention: 
"This, of course, could have furnished no objection to re-
moval of the cause from the State court, because at the time 
these parties had not been admitted to the cause; and their 
introduction afterwards as co-complainants did not oust the 
jurisdiction of the court, already lawfully acquired, as be-
tween the original parties."194 
In the true and hybrid class suits, intervention will be allowed 
even when the applicant does not satisfy the jurisdictional re-
quirements. In the spurious-type suit, however, Professor Moore's 
thesis that "other persons similarly situated [are able] to intervene 
without regard to jurisdictional limitations applicable to original 
parties,"1915 while approved in a number of cases,196 has not been 
consistently followed.197 Wagner v. Kemper198 did not permit in-
1oa 115 U.S. 61 (1885). 
104 Id. at 64. See also Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921); 
Boesenberg v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 128 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942); Developments in 
the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 941 (1958). 
1915 3 MOORE 1J 23.10, at 3444. 
196 Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959); Zelley v. Muehleck, 10 F.R.D. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 
70 F. Supp. 870 (W .D. Pa. 1947). 
10'1' Wagner v. Kemper, 13 F.R.D. 128 (W .D. Mo. 1952). The court relied on 
Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948), where the original parties 
did not have the jurisdictional amount. Except for the class device there must be inde-
pendent grounds of jurisdiction by the intervenor. Hunter v. Southern lndem. Under-
writers, 47 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ky. 1942). 
198 13 F.R.D. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1952). 
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tervention by a number of persons in the absence of an independ-
ent showing of satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements of di-
versity and amount. There was sufficient confusion in the rule 
to suggest to the Wagner court that, contrary to some other deci-
sions and contrary to the results in true and hybrid class suit cases, 
intervention may not be allowed in the spurious-type suit if the 
intervenors fail to satisfy these jurisdictional requirements. 
While both sections (a) and (b) of federal rule 24 provide that 
the filing of the application for intervention must be timely,190 
and while the application usually is made at an early stage of the 
proceedings,200 a special effectiveness of the spurious class suit de-
vice lies in the fact that intervention can be allowed here even 
after a judgment favorable to the class.201 Liberality in permitting 
intervention after judgment has been urged202 and was effected in 
State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,203 in which 
intervention was permitted two and one-half years after proofs 
had been closed on the issue of liability. By permitting interven-
tion at such a late stage the greatest utility of the "spurious" device 
is achieved to avoid duplicative suits, to dispose of multiple claims 
based on identical facts and law which are similar but not identical. 
Since this decision is not uniformly followed, however, a rule ex-
plicitly providing for intervention at a late stage of the proceed-
ing-or even after judgment-is needed. 
K. Res ] udicata204 
While there is a need for a modern effective remedy to dispose 
of multi-party litigations, the procedural device of the class suit-
any class suit-conflicts with the deep-rooted principle of Anglo-
199 Distini v. Cunningham, 272 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1959); 4 MooRE ,f 24.13. 
200 Tatem v. Southern Transp. Co., 8 FED. RULES SERV. 24c.32, Case 1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 
1945). 
:201 Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956). 
202 Note, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 632 (1958). 
203 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
204 CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 250 (1950); 3 MOORE ,f 23.11; Kalven &: Rosen• 
field, The Contemporary Function of the Class $uit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1941); Keeffe, 
Levy &: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Moore &: Cohn, 
Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REv. 555 (1938); 
Comment, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1947); Note, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 525, 528 (1949); Note, 
34 CoLUM. L. REv. 118, 132-39 (1934); Note, 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 818, 824 (1946); Note, 67 
HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1954); Note, 39 IOWA L. REv. 365 (1954); Note, 13 u. KAN. CITY 
L. REv. 163 (1945): Note, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472 (1954); Comment, Denial of Due Process 
Through Use of the Class Action, 25 TEXAS L. REv. 64, 65 (1946). 
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American jurisprudence that no one shall be bound by a judgment 
without having had an opportunity to litigate his own claim in 
his own way. 
Nevertheless, because of the obvious need in a representative 
suit, a judgment was recognized in some cases as being binding on 
those individuals who, although not made actual parties, could be 
identified with the suit as "virtual" parties.205 Thus the develop-
ment of the class suit in equity procedure. Deletion in subsequent 
rules of the last sentence of the old Federal Equity Rule 48-"the 
decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all 
the absent parties"-implied that the drafters, while still recog-
nizing the traditional principles, did consider a representative-suit 
judgment binding in the exceptional cases. And despite the ab-
sence of any specific rule on the subject, modern decisions have 
in similar cases applied the evolved doctrine of res judicata.206 
The general principles concerning the binding effect of a 
judgment in class actions are simple enough. In a true class action 
all the members of the class are bound by the judgment;207 a 
hybrid class action is conclusive as to all members of the class inso-
far as the fond or property is involved,2°8 and a spurious class ac-
tion is conclusive only on those who are participating parties or 
who somehow intervene in the action.209 Ineptitudes of categoriza-
tion, however, have led some courts to ignore the classifications 
and to decide on the basis of other factors as heretofore suggested. 
"The nature of the class, procedural safeguards, and judicial ad-
ministration in granting relief"210 have determined that the judg-
ment is binding upon absent persons when it appears from the 
record that there are individuals who have an interest in common 
205 Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. lbs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. 
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Richard· 
son v. Kelly, 191 S.W .2d 857 (Tex. 1945). 
206 Professor Moore recommended, in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Prob-
lems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 571 (1937), that the federal 
rules contain a provision keying res judicata to the type of class suit, but the com-
mittee rejected the proposal as being a matter of substance. ADVISORY CoMMITIEE ON 
RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT 60 (1937). 
207 3 MooRE 11 23.11, at 3460-61; Judge Goodrich in Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 
F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W .D. Pa. 
1947); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 86, comment b (1942). 
208 3 MOORE 11 23.11, at 3468. 
209 3 MOORE 1J 23.11, at 3465. 
210 Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. 
L. REv. 874, 936 (1958). 
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with those who sue or defend, whose interests are tied by some 
bond of association. A judgment is held to be res judicata upon 
absent persons in actions involving unincorporated associations,211 
in stockholders' suits,212 in taxpayers' actions,213 and in creditors' 
bills.214 
In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,215 certain citizens, 
none of whom resided in Indiana, brought action in the federal 
district court of Indiana against the Supreme Tribe, an assurance 
society, to enjoin what was claimed to be an unlawful use of trust 
funds by the defendant. The suit was brought for the benefit of 
all members holding class A certificates (some 70,000) to contest 
the Tribe's reclassification of certificates. A final decree was en-
tered dismissing the bill, and later certain Indiana residents filed 
suit in the state court of Indiana which would have relitigated the 
questions settled by the judgment of the federal court. The Tribe 
then sought an injunction against the Indiana residents to restrain 
them from prosecuting the action. The United States Supreme 
Court held that the Indiana citizens were members of the class; 
that their rights were duly represented by those parties before the 
federal court, and therefore the previous decree was binding upon 
them. 
The decision, standing alone, is a strong holding supporting 
the rule stated above of the binding effect on a "true class suit" 
judgment upon absent but represented members of a true class. 
Comparison of Hansberry v. Lee,216 discussed earlier, is clearly 
appropriate here. There the question arose as to the effectiveness 
of a restrictive covenant which was to become effective when 
211 Armstrong v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. 341, 159 Pac. 1176 (1916); People ex rel. 
Stearns v. Marr, 181 N.Y. 463, 74 N.E. 431 (1905). 
212 Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir. 1916); Kaufmann v. Annuity Realty Co., 
301 Mo. 638, 256 S.W. 792 (1923); Moore &: Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and 
Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. R.Ev. 555, 559 (1938); Note, 34 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 118, 136 
(1934). 
213 Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N.E. 161 (1887); Ashton 
v. City of Rochester, 133 N.Y. 187, 30 N.E. 965, 14 N.Y. Supp. 855 (1892); Note, 34 CoLUM, 
L. REV. 118, 138 (1934). 
214 Towel v. Donnell, 49 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1931); Throckmorton v. Hickman, 279 Fed. 
196 (3d Cir. 1922). 
215 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
216 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Keeffe, Levy &: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 
327,337 (1948) say: "It seems unlikely, however, that the Ben Hur case, were it to come up 
for the first time today, would reach the same result, for its doctrine as to res judicata 
seems irre~~ncilable with the position of the Supreme Court in the case of Hansberry 
v. Lee .••• 
1962] CLASS SUITS 947 
"signed by the owners . . of ninety-five per cent of the front-
age."217 After one action to enforce the covenant was successful, 
subsequent litigation sought to strike down the covenant. The 
Supreme Court of Illinois218 held that the first action was a class 
suit and that the present parties were bound by that previous 
decision, but the United States Supreme Court reversed,219 holding 
that due process was violated since the interests of the represented 
parties might well be antagonistic--one sub-class of the group 
seeking to uphold the covenant, another sub-class wishing to defeat 
it. Hence the class suit did not afford "that protection to absent 
parties which due process requires."220 The language used by the 
Court suggests that a possible ground for the decision was that no 
notice had been given to any member of the class and therefore 
the absentees were not bound.221 But the clear sense of the opinion 
is that the class, if any, of persons who were earlier represented 
and wanted the covenant enforced did not include those who 
might elect to reject the covenant.222 The rule to be found in Hans-
berry is not that all persons represented in a class suit must agree 
with the purposes of the acting plaintiff in order for them to be 
bound by the judgment, nor is it that due process cannot exist for 
purposes of applying res judicata unless all represented persons 
are members of some lodge or comparable voluntary association. 
The rule is simply and clearly, as stated, that there exists no class 
for such purposes "where it cannot be said that the procedure 
adopted fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent par-
ties who are to be bound by it." 
Cases223 subsequent to Hansberry have continued to apply the 
doctrine of res judicata in class suits, recognizing the fact that 
Hansberry has not eliminated this principle in such actions. 
217 Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519, 524 (1934). 
21s 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939). 
210 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
220 Id. at 45. 
221 Id. at 42. 
222 Comment, 25 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 64, 74 (1946); see also Note, 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1059, 
1062 (1954); Note, 49 YALE L.J. 1125, 1127 (1940). 
223 Waybright v. Columbia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1941); Inter-
national Allied Printing Trades Ass'n v. Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 
1940). The language of Judge Goodrich in Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 852 
(3d Cir. 1945) is: "The learned district judge was in error when he said, in his opinion 
in this case it was 'too astonishing to be accepted' that one unwilling to appear in a 
suit might be bound by the judgment therein. That is just what does happen in case of 
a true class action." 
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In the case of the spurious class suit, whether the members of 
the class are entitled to the same or to separate relief, courts have 
held that a previous adjudication is not binding upon the absent 
parties.224 Here, it is said, the judgment binds only those persons 
who are before the court, including those who intervene and were 
made parties.225 Various proposals have been made to apply the 
doctrine of res judicata to the spurious class action. Keeffe, Levy, 
and Donovan226 suggest that, since the Supreme Court in Hans-
berry did not foreclose the possibility that res judicata would apply 
to a spurious class suit,221 notice should be given to the members 
of the class to provide them with an opportunity to participate in 
the litigation or be bound by the decision. And one writer228 argues 
that due process would be satisfied if timely notice were given and 
an opportunity to participate provided.229 Another view suggests 
that only the common issues be held to be res judicata.230 
Possibility of non-legislative extension, however, was rejected 
in the recent federal district court case of Pennsylvania R.R. v. 
United States.231 Ammunition stored at Perth Amboy exploded, 
causing widespread damage to persons and property, resulting in 
the filing of over 30 death actions, 110 injury actions and 8,000 
suits for property damage. Pennsylvania Railroad, one of the possi-
ble tort-feasors, brought a "spurious type" class action against 
representative claimants for a declaratory judgment to determine 
its legal responsibility, and it urged the court to apply the princi-
ple of res judicata to all known and unknown claimants. The court 
rejected this proposal and refused to permit its decision to be 
binding on any claimant who had not become a party. The court 
recognized the difficulties inherent in disposing of this mass of 
claims but concluded: 
224 Schatte v. International Alliance, 183 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1950); Pentland v. Dravo 
Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young&: Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 
(2d Cir. 1944) (dictum); Albrecht v. Bauman, 130 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Hurd v. 
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1955); Walton v. Poplos, 32 Del. Ch. 292, 
85 A.2d 75 (1951). 
225 York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944). 
226 Keeffe, Levy&: Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 342 (1948). 
221 Hansberry v. Lee, 3ll U.S. 32, 42 (1940). 
228 Note, 46 Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 818, 833 (1946). 
229 See the proposals summarized in Note, 7 OKLA. L. R.Ev. 472 (1954), and the dis• 
cussion concerning notice in Note, 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1059, 1062-65 (1954). 
230 Montgomery Ward &: Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 189·90 (8th Cir. 1948); Pascale 
v. Emery, 95 F. Supp. 147 (D. Mass. 1951); Note, 50 YALE L.J. 90, 95 (1940). 
231 Ill F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953), discussed in Note, 63 YALE L.J. 493, 5ll (1954). 
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"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and existing legis-
lation do not provide a satisfactory solution of the problems 
presented by the legal controversies arising out of accidents 
such as the South Amboy explosion. They are controversies 
in which the common questions of law and fact should be 
tried in one action in which every individual and corporation 
accused of liability and the United States could be joined, 
in which all claimants could be represented and in which all 
the evidence could be presented. Such a result, however, can-
not be achieved unless Congress modifies, in this unusual type 
of situaton, the requirements of complete diversity of citizen-
ship, allows service of summons outside of the district wherein 
the court hearing the case sits, and permits a federal court to 
enjoin all other suits arising out of the same occurrence."232 
It seems hard indeed to foreclose anyone's personal claim with-
out permitting him to present his own facts by an attorney of his 
choice, with the chance to exercise for himself the available trial 
strategies. Would such a foreclosure be buying judicial efficiency 
at too high a price? Would new legislation attempting this for the 
sake of expediting multiple-claim situations violate inviolable 
principles? The Supreme Court of the United States, in Hansberry 
v. Lee, strongly hints that it would not-if there can be insured a 
"protection of the interests of absent parties" and a "full and fair 
consideration of the common issues."233 Accordingly, in the con-
clusion of this paper it will be urged that model or uniform legis-
lation be adopted along these lines. 
Even under the present procedures, the common opponent 
who has lost in the representative action may be prevented from 
relitigating issues common to the claimants in each separate new 
proceeding. It has been suggested234 that the common issues would 
once and for all be foreclosed, so that the defendant would not be 
permitted to continue to relitigate the question. "There seems to 
be no good reason why the defendant should be permitted con-
tinual relitigation of a factual problem already judicially deter-
mined."235 A technical justification for the defendant to relitigate 
common issues is the fact that the defendant may be entitled to a 
jury trial. But in an analogous situation-a case involving permis-
232 Ill F. Supp. at 91. 
233 llll U.S. 32, 42 (1940). 
234 Note, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 472, 474 (1954). 
235 Note, Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Act, 50 YALE L.J. 90, 95 (1940). 
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sive joinder of plaintiffs-Akely v. Kinnicut,23G in which the de-
fendants contended that they should be entitled to a jury trial as 
to each plaintiff, the court rejected the contention and held that 
the defendants did not have a right to a separate trial by jury on 
each claim. As long as the "substance of the right of trial by jury is 
preserved," the right is not violated.237 
L. Attorneys' F ees238 
It has been traditional in true,239 hybrid,240 and spurious241 
type suits to award a reasonable attorneys' fee reimbursement to a 
party who has by his expense and effort in a representative suit 
created or captured the fund or property in which others may 
share.242 The basic principles are that represented persons who are 
entitled to share benefits should also share the expenses,243 and that 
"property which has been secured by the services of an attorney 
should bear the cost thereof."244 These principles are implicit in 
the theory that "the plaintiff is the representative of the whole class 
236 238 N.Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682 (1924). 
237 Id. at 475, 144 N.E. at 685. 
238 See the excellent article by Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor 
in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REv. 658 (1956). His other writings dealing with 
stockholders' suits are: Note, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLUM. 
L. REY. 784 (1939); New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLUM. L. REY. 1 
I (1947). 
239 Harris v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 197 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1952); Confederated Bands of 
Ute Indians v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 609 (1951). 
240 Nolte v. Hudson Nav. Co., 47 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1931); Central Trust Co. v. United 
States Light &: Heating Co., 233 Fed. 420 (2d Cir. 1916); Helm v. Smith-Fee Co., 79 Minn. 
297, 299, 82 N.W. 639, 640 (1900); White v. University Land Co., 49 Mo. App. 450 (1892). 
241 Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 66 (7th Cir. 1939); Paris v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
242 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'! Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Hobbs v. McLean, 117 
U.S. 567 (1886); Central R.R. &: Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trustees v. 
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Fitch, 354 Mo. 638, 190 
S.W.2d 215 (1945); Aetna Ins. Co. v. O'Malley, 124 S.W.2d 1164 (Mo. 1938) (award 
governed by legislative appropriation); White v. University Land Co., 49 Mo. App. 450 
(1892). See Annots., 49 A.L.R. 1149 (1927); 107 A.L.R. 749 (1937). The principle had its 
origin in the English courts of chancery-see historical discussion by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, supra at 164. 
243 "The rule is established that where one goes into a coun of equity and takes 
the risks of litigation upon himself, and successfully creates, protects, or preserves the 
fund, to share in which others are entitled, those others will not be allowed to lie back 
and share the results of the successful labors, without contributing their due share. And 
a court of equity ••• requires payment out of the fund before distribution, of reasonable 
costs and expenses, including reasonable counsel fees of the complainant whose diligence 
has created or preserved the fund •.•• " Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1149, 1153 (1927). 
244 Hornstein, supra note 238, 69 HARv. L. REv. 658 (1956). See also Note, 33 No'IRE 
DAME LAw. 651 (1958). 
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and is authorized to contract for all with respect to the expenses of 
the litigation," and in the fairness theory of quasi-contract.245 In 
one of the leading decisions, Trustees v. Greenough,246 a holder of 
railroad bonds sued on behalf of himself and other bondholders 
to set aside certain conveyances and to appoint a receiver to care 
for the property which was being sold at nominal prices. The liti-
gation on behalf of the plaintiff was successful, the fund was saved, 
and a considerable amount of money was realized for all the hold-
ers of the bonds. The plaintiff bore the burden of the litigation, 
advanced money for expenses, and employed attorneys to realize 
this result. A question arose as to allowance of expenses and at-
torneys' fees. The Supreme Court of the United States allowed the 
attorney fees and expenses, stating: 
"[I]n a case like the present, where the bill was filed not only 
in behalf of the complainant himself, but in behalf of the 
other bondholders having an equal interest in the fund; ... 
and done at great expense and trouble on the part of the com-
plainant; and the other bondholdrs have come in and partici-
pated in the benefits resulting from his proceedings, . . . he 
may be said to have saved the fund for the cestuis que 
trust . ... It would be very hard on him to turn him away 
without any allowance except the paltry sum which could be 
taxed under the fee-bill. It would not only be unjust to him, 
but it would give to the other parties entitled to participate in 
the benefits of the fund an unfair advantage."247 
That attorneys' fees are awarded in spurious suits can be seen from 
the case of Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,248 in which attorneys 
applied for an additional allowance of fees after they were success-
ful in recovering retroactive compensation due to certain life in-
surance agents employed by the insurance company. The court 
awarded an additional fee of 225,000 dollars for services rendered, 
taking into consideration the novel and complicated problems in-
volved in the litigation. It is apparent also that when the attorneys 
representing the initial parties are successful in the spurious suit, 
so that others may intervene to assert their demands, the original 
attorneys should be entitled to a proportion of the recovery of the 
245 Note, 33 NoTRE DAME LAw. 651, 652 (1958). 
246 105 U.S. 527 (1881). 
247 Id. at 532. 
248 94 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
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intervenors. Otherwise grave inequities could result. Absentees 
could await the outcome of the initial litigation, and then through 
their own attorneys take advantage of a judgment without being 
responsible to the successful attorneys whose efforts aided in cre-
ating the interests for the absentees.249 
To entitle attorneys to a fee collectible in part from persons 
merely "represented," i.e., from the members of a spurious class, 
the efforts compensated must have resulted in the creation or in-
crease of a fund in which such represented persons may share.250 
When that is established the court in its sound discretion251 will 
take into consideration in determining the amount of fees: the 
nature, character and extent of the service rendered; the time 
devoted to the matter by the attorneys; the professional standing of 
the attorneys and their degrees of professional skill and experience; 
the value of the fund; and the favorable result and benefits ob-
tained. 
Although some special difficulties in determining the proper 
and fair amount of attorneys' fees should be expected to be en-
countered in the spurious type suit, that suit should not therefore 
be treated differently in this respect from other types. The theory 
of the spurious suit device-that the rights are separate, that each 
person would be entitled to seek separate relief-would seem con-
sistent with requiring that no represented person may gain unless 
he submit to bear his own proportion of fees. One barrier may be 
canon 28 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. That provides: "It 
is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a law-
suit .... It is disreputable to ... breed litigation by seeking out 
those having claims for personal injuries or those having any other 
ground of action in order to secure them as clients .... " However, 
it has been suggested that in such wide-ranging affairs as represent-
ative suits the attorney should be allowed reasonable latitude in 
soliciting intervenors as long as this is done under the auspices 
of the court.252 If the spurious suit is to be successful some reason-
249 Note, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 627, 636 (1958). See also Comment, Suit by Class Repre-
sentation in Ohio, 20 U. CINC. L. R.Ev. 85, 114 (1951). 
250 Thomas v. Peyser, 118 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Matter of Attorney Gen. v. North 
Am. Life Ins. Co., 91 N.Y. 57 (1883); Note, 33 NoTRE DAME LAw. 651, 652 (1958). Even 
where the litigation has become moot, it has been held that attorneys are entitled to a 
fee, Lafferty v. Humphrey, 248 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
251 Central Trust Co. v. United States Light & Heating Co., 233 Fed. 420 (2d Cir. 1916). 
252 Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in 
Illinois, 42 ILL. L. R.Ev. 518, 532 (1947). 
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able notification should be permitted, and if this is supervised by 
the court there should be no violation of the canon. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
It has been shown that there are two kinds of situations wherein 
under existing rules the representative suit remedy is readily and 
consistently made available for single-litigation disposal of multi-
ple-party claims: first, where numerous absent parties and those 
representing them are already tied together in some consensual 
or status relationship constituting a "true class" under traditional 
equity standards; and second where the relief sought is the valida-
tion or division of some specific collectively-claimed fund or asset 
subject to the court's jurisdiction. In these situations, by and large, 
the results show that the remedy functions well-although prob-
lems of pleadings, evidence, and internal procedures in the suit 
generally are complicated by the exigencies of the due representa-
tion of absent parties, foreclosing their rights. 
But it is seen also that there is a further area of potential use-
fulness of the representative suit in which the present rules have 
not served at all well-that is, where there has existed neither a 
"true class" nor a community of claim to a specific common relief 
or common fund. The hard question is whether in this increasingly 
important area the representative suit can and ought to be made 
functional; and it has been said in many cases that the doctrine of 
res judicata cannot constitutionally and fairly be applied to bar 
the rights of absent "represented" persons. 
The Supreme Court of the United States broadly hints other-
wise, however, in its opinion in Hansberry v. Lee,253 saying: 
"There is scope within the framework of the Constitution 
for holding in appropriate cases that a judgment rendered in 
a class suit is res judicata as to members of the class who are 
not formal parties to the suit. Here, as elsewhere, the Four-
teenth Amendment does not compel state courts or legisla-
tures to adopt any particular rule for establishing the conclu-
siveness of judgments in class suits; ... nor does it compel the 
adoption of the particular rules thought by this Court to be 
appropriate for the federal courts. With a proper regard for 
divergent local institutions and interests, . . . this Court is 
253 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
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justified in saying that there has been a failure of due process 
only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure 
adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent 
parties who are to be bound by it."254 
It is the conception of the recommendations herein that a pro-
cedure "fairly insuring the protection of the interests of absent 
parties" can be effected by legislation imposing upon the court 
directly the duty of judicially determining and finding as a condi-
tion of final judgment (a) that there has existed throughout all the 
proceedings an adequate and diligent representation and protec-
tion of the rights of absent represented persons, and (b) that the 
judgment is intended to be binding upon those persons. That a 
judgment may be binding upon those persons who are not parties 
of record in the so-called "spurious type" class suit, when an ade-
quate procedure for notification is adopted, finds favor in the 
language of the Supreme Court in Hansberry: 
"Nor do we find it necessary for the decision of this case to 
say that, when the only circumstance defining the class is that 
the determination of the rights of its members turns upon a 
single issue of fact or law, a state• could not constitutionally 
adopt a procedure whereby some of the members of the class 
could stand in judgment for all, provided that the procedure 
were so devised and applied as to insure that those present are 
of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is so 
conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the 
common issue"255 
If adequate personal notice were given to known absent claim-
ants ensuring assertion of their claims within the time specified by 
the court, the procedure thereby adopted would, in view of recent 
developments in the field of acquisition of in personam jurisdic-
tion, seem to be consistent with due process. State barriers have 
ceased to place limitations upon the courts in any particular forum; 
the trend in the past decade or two has been to expand the permis-
sible scope of jurisdiction. Keeffe, Levy, and Donovan256 have 
argued that it is a proper problem of public concern to adjudicate 
254 Id. at 42. It is submitted arguendo that in the context of this quotation, as else-
where, and in federal rule 23, the Court uses the terms "class" and "class suit" to include 
the so-called "spurious" class suit. 
255 Id. at 43. 
256 Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 347 (1948). 
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issues as to all members of the class without multiple actions, and 
that the issues in common should be foreclosed as to all members of 
the class. Since the publication of the Keeffe article, judicial recog-
nition of the transformation of our national economy has made fair 
and reasonable notice, rather than territorial power, the important 
consideration.257 It would now seem to be a logical step in the 
progression to provide a procedure whereby the absentees, upon 
adequate notice, would be foreclosed from re-trying their indi-
vidual claims. 
Under such a rule or statute there could be one determination 
made which would dispose of all the numerous claims of the mem-
bers of a group dependent upon the same fact pattern. If the deci-
sion were favorable to the group, absentee members would be able 
to assert their claims and have them determined by supplementary 
proceedings. If, on the other hand, the decision were adverse to 
the group, res judicata would be applicable only to all members 
personally notified. If personal notification had been given to all 
members of the class, they would thus all be foreclosed from reliti-
gating. This procedure, under the language of Hansberry, should 
not be unconstitutional. And such a procedure, foreclosing the 
interests of members of the group when the defendant is successful, 
would not only assure the defendant that he would not be bur-
dened with innumerable additional litigations after using every 
effort to defend the initial suit, but would achieve judicial effi-
ciency in disposing of numerous claims in one action. 
It must be admitted that persons who neither appeared nor 
were personally served could not be foreclosed, and could maintain 
their separate actions. The difficulty in making the issues res 
judicata as to all members of the group (notified or not) when the 
decision is favorable to the defendant is that it is hard to propose 
that individual rights should be foreclosed without notice in an 
action brought by a total stranger, whose only relationship would 
be the fortuitous circumstance giving rise to common questions of 
law and fact. Nevertheless, these multiple-party similar-fact situa-
tions cry for a procedure that will dispose of the multiple claims 
fairly as to all concerned. The proposal herein, it is submitted, 
balances these conflicting values and is consonant with due process. 
257 Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Nelson v. Miller, 11 III. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 
(1957). 
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Although the issues could still in some instances be re-tried by 
unnotifi.ed "represented" persons, this difficulty may be more appa-
rent than real. In many instances, all the members of the group 
would be known and personal notice could be achieved. Publica-
tion could be made, inviting unknown members of the group to 
participate and assert their claims. If any should do so their inter-
ests would, of course, be foreclosed in the event of a decision favor-
able to the defendant. Furthermore, if the defendant is successful, 
the individual claims may be such as not to justify separate actions 
upon issues once lost. And the defendant would be, under the sug-
gested statute, safe at least against the claims of those members 
who had been served with adequate notice in the first action. The 
alternative-to foreclose the rights of persons who neither ap-
peared nor had been accorded opportunity to appear-would be 
undesirable, even if to do so, for the sake of judicial and public 
convenience, might be constitutional under the broad implications 
of Hansberry. 
The difficulties presented by use of the representative suit are 
varied and complex. Traditional conservatism, unfortunate and 
artificial classifications, failure of existing rules to provide ex-
plicit guidance in certain instances-all these combine to make the 
device something less than the modern, effective judicial remedy 
it could become. If this device is ever to fulfill its potential in mod-
ern procedure, the wording of the rules and statutes relating to 
representative actions should be improved to state the intention 
to cover the situation where there are numerous parties and their 
claims have only questions of law or fact in common. This ap-
proach would make it possible to divorce the historical principles 
evolved in "class" actions, with their technicalities and limitations, 
from the modern remedy. In this new device, where the questions 
of fact or law are common to numerous persons, the common is-
sues258 relating to liability appropriately may be tried first, and if 
those be adjudicated favorably to the represented group then other 
persons, after notification, can be permitted to present their claims 
before a master or trustee appointed by the court. Thus, the com-
mon issues will be litigated only once, and the individual issues 
will be determined by an officer so that the court will not be bur-
258 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 189-90 (8th Cir. 1948); Pascale 
v. Emery, 95 F. Supp. 147, 149 (D.C. Mass. 1951). 
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dened with time-consuming testimony on individual claims. Those 
persons who do not appear to present their claims or who are not 
parties of record will have to be bound, subject to appeal, under 
the principles of res judicata if the court has obtained jurisdiction 
over them by adequate notification; they will be free to litigate 
their own claims if it has not. Notice can be given to permit indi-
vidual claimants to present their demands, even after judgment, 
and such notice should, subject to sufficiency of the grounds for 
representative suit procedure, be made binding upon those who do 
not present their claims.269 Liberal intervention should be allowed 
to permit the claimants to present their claims even after judg-
ment.260 Those persons who would have a tendency to lie back and 
await a favorable verdict would, of course, be responsible for their 
proportionate share of costs and attorneys' fees in accordance with 
the traditional principles concerning attorneys' fees in class actions. 
It is proposed, therefore, that federal rule 23(a)(3) and the state 
rules based thereon be repealed, and the rules amended to provide 
for a new rule along the following lines: 
If there are numerous persons having separate rights and 
it is or may be impracticable for each of them to maintain 
suit individually, and there is a common question of law or 
fact affecting the several rights of the parties, and a common 
relief is sought, one or more of such persons may maintain 
action for himself and all others similarly situated. Aggrega-
tion of the amounts in controvery shall be allowed. 
Intervention may be permitted by the court at any time, 
even after judgment, without regard to diversity of citizen-
ship or amount261 so as to permit a claimant to present and 
prove his claim. The court shall have the power to appoint a 
master or other officer or officers to hear and determine the 
claims, and such officers may take such evidence and proof as 
are deemed to be necessary. Evidence with regard to personal 
defenses which may bar the right of the individual claimant 
to recover may be taken. Personal or other adequate notice 
shall be given to known potential claimants as directed by the 
court to provide opportunity to present their claims. 
259 Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 256; Note, 46 CoLuM. L. REv. 818, 833 (1946). 
260 Two and one-half years had elapsed since proofs had been closed on issue of 
liability in State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. 
Ill. 1959). 
261 This part of the rule would be omitted in the state rules. 
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Matters of fact and law in common shall be conclusive 
upon the defendants and upon those claimants who within the 
time authorized by the court present and prove their claims. 
And if there be a finding upon sufficient record and evidence 
that all the rights of persons represented who did not appear 
were adequately and fairly represented as to the common is-
sues of law and fact, all persons who were personally or other-
wise adequately notified262 and who did not appear to present 
their claims within the time authorized by the court shall be 
foreclosed from further litigating their claims. Persons not so 
notified, however, shall not be foreclosed. 
If such a rule or model statute were adopted, many controver-
sies in the state courts which involve numerous parties would be 
decided and disposed of instead of being dismissed as is presently 
the case under the code provisions. Under the present state rules, 
the result is that either the claimants have no effective remedy be-
cause of the time and expense in seeking recovery for small sums, 
or that the courts are needlessly over-burdened because each per-
son must maintain a separate action. 
262 Notice, "reasonably calculated •.• to apprise interested parties of the pendency 
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections," under some-
what analogous state legislation was passed upon by the United States Supreme Court in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank b Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Legislation 
adopted in New York empowered trust companies to establish common trust funds and 
invest as one mingled fund the assets of small estates. Notification to beneficiaries for the 
judicial settlement of the trustee's account was to be by publication-"a notice or 
citation addressed generally without naming [the beneficiaries]." Central Hanover Bank, 
following the legislative directive, petitioned for settlement and informed the beneficiaries 
as prescribed by law. Mullane, who had been appointed special guardian for the bene-
ficiaries, objected to the form of notice. Unsuccessful in the state courts, Mullane appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States. That Court held that the notice by publica-
tion required by the banking law of New York was incompatible with the fourteenth 
amendment when it sought to foreclose the personal rights of known beneficiaries. A 
clear implication of the decision is that if due and adequate notification had been given 
to those known beneficiaries, due process requirements would then have been satisfied. 
Such implication accords with the hypothesis submitted in the text that upon adequate 
notification to those known absentee members of a class, foreclosure of personal rights 
should not offend due process. And, analogously, if the judicial settlement had been 
undertaken by employing the representative-suit technique, similar adequate notice to 
absent "represented" beneficiaries likewise should satisfy requirements of due process. 
The decision and its possible broad implications are discussed in Perry, The Mullane 
Doctrine-A Reappraisal of Statutory Notice Requirements, CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE 
LEGISLATION 33 (University of Mich. Legislative Research Center 1952); Fraser, Jurisdic-
tion by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 305 (1951); Note, 
50 MicH. L. R.Ev. 124 (1951). 
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And in the federal courts such a rule would expand the concept 
of the spurious suit from a mere permissive joinder device to one 
which permits disposition of the numerous claims of many persons. 
By allowing absentees to intervene after judgment if their side is 
successful on the common issues and have their claims determined 
by an officer of the court without the necessity of proving again 
the facts and law common to the members of the group, and fore-
closing those who have been adequately notified but have not in-
tervened, an efficient judicial remedy would be provided. While · 
some decisions in the federal system recognize the utility of the 
spurious action, uniform treatment has not been achieved, nor will 
it be as long as the "class suit" doctrines govern the remedy for the 
disposition of such group interests. The above proposal would re-
tain the elements of judicial procedure and at the same time ade-
quately permit disposition of complex problems which today con-
front the courts and tomorrow may create chaos. 




In an effort to determine the practical procedural problems confronting 
court and counsel in class suits and to assess the effectiveness of the spurious 
suit in particular, a field study was undertaken. Eighteen cases considered 
to be fairly typical were chosen for examination.1 Various types of cases 
were selected: actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, cases involving 
price discriminations, suits by creditors to set aside fraudulent transfers, 
libel suits, and others. An inquiry was addressed to both trial counsel2 and 
trial judges.3 Numerous questions were asked and comments were invited. 
Among the questions asked were the following: 
1 Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952); Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 
152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young &: Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 
1944); State Wholesale Grocers v. Great At!. &: Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. III. 
1959); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959); Canuel v. Oskoian, 23 F.R.D. 307 (D.R.I. 1959); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 
311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Zelley v. Muehleck, 10 F.R.D. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Rosenberg v. 
Globe Aircraft Co., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Shipley v. Pittsburgh &: L.E. R.R., 
70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Schempf v. Armour &: Co., 5 F.R.D. 294 (D. Minn. 
1946); Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ohio 1943); McReynolds v. 
Louisville Taxicab &: Transfer Co., 5 F.R.D. 61 (W.D. Ky. 1942); Heffernan v. Bennett 
&: Armour Co., 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. App. 1952); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 III. 
2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959); Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 III. App. 2d 21, 149 
N.E.2d 472 (1958); Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 III. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951); Locke 
v. City of Detroit, 335 Mich. 29, 55 N.W.2d 161 (1952); Salt Lake City v. Utah Lake 
Farmers Ass'n, 4 Utah 2d 14, 286 P.2d 773 (1955). 
2 Inquiry usually by letter: "In the case of ... which involved a 'class suit' under 
modem rules of civil procedure, your firm represented one of the litigants in the 
cause. The reported decision indicates that the class suit was proper under the cir-
cumstances. 
"Inasmuch as I am doing research on Procedural Problems of Class Suits . • • I 
would appreciate your help in determining the events that occurred after the reported 
decision. I am particularly interested in those procedural and trial problems that 
confronted you after the appellate court determined that the class action was proper, 
and the solution of those problems. I would also appreciate your comments concerning 
the aftermath of the reported decision in order that a comparison can be made with 
the numerous other cases throughout the country so that a single article will condense 
the various problems for the guidance of other attorneys who may be faced with 
similar cases. 
"In particular, I am interested in obtaining information as to the procedural methods 
used in proving the claim of each member of the class and of disposing of the funds of 
the class. 
"I have prepared a questionnaire which I enclose to give you some indication of 
the scope of the problems as I see them. I am sure, however, that other matters will 
come to your mind, and I welcome any comments you may have." 
3 Inquiry usually in letter form: "In the past several years there have been a great 
number of reported decisions dealing with class suits. The courts, I feel, are struggling 
to find some uniformly effecting method to dispose of multiparty claims when the 
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What specific allegations did the petition contain to satisfy the require-
ment of adequacy of representation? 
How many members of the class were there? v\7hat were the considera-
tions in choosing the ones to represent the class? 
What benefits did you consider appropriate that prompted the class 
device? 
Was any notification given to the members of the class before or after 
the filing of the suit to the effect that suit was contemplated or pending or 
filed? 
Were persons not joined in the original action allowed to intervene? 
At what stage of the proceedings were intervenors allowed? Before 
judgment? After judgment? 
How were intervenors notified to participate? 
How were the intervenors' claims handled? 
Was a master appointed to hear the various claims? 
Were claims other than intervenors' approved and paid for? 
Was a jury trial held? If so, did the jury hear the various claims of the 
members of the class? 
What proof was made to satisfy the requirement of adequacy of repre-
sentation at trial? 
What procedural method was used to hear and determine amounts due 
each member of the class? 
How were attorneys' fees handled in this case? Was the fee taken out of 
the class funds? Did the intervenors contribute to the fee? 
Were discovery procedures used to determine the persons in the class? 
Were instructions given in the case? If so, may I have copies? 
Were there any particular evidentiary problems involved regarding the 
class suit aspect of the case? 
Were any objections made by the adversary as to any individual claims? 
If so, how were they handled? 
How were costs handled? Did the members of the class contribute? 
parties are so numerous that it is highly impractical to bring all having common 
questions of fact or law before the court. 
"I am presently engaged in a research project dealing with the Procedural Problems 
of the Class Suit in order to determine the feasibility of the class suit device to handle 
multiple party claims where many persons have matters in common ...• As a part of 
that project I am seeking comments concerning the worth of the spurious class device. 
Since you are in a position to have knowledge of the multitude of problems involved, 
having recently had occasion to hear the case of . • . , I would deeply appreciate 
such comments as you may have concerning the class suit • • • ." 
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If a master ·or receiver was appointed how were his fees taken care of? 
Several observations can be made concerning the results of the survey: 
I. The expense and consumption of time in class actions seem to be so 
great that at least 50% of the cases were settled or dismissed. One case4 be-
came so expensive and time-consuming that original counsel withdrew, 
substitute counsel was employed and fared no better, and the case was 
finally dismissed.5 Other cases were settled perhaps short of indicated value.6 
2. No notice of any kind was given to any member of the class prior to 
or during trial in any of the cases surveyed, although in two7 cases notifica-
tion was given after judgment to permit claimants to participate in the 
judgment. 
3. Discovery and pre-trial procedures were not utilized to any great 
extent. In one case,8 pre-trial would have been very helpful. In another 
case9 involving the Fair Labor Standards Act interrogatories were sent to 
the employer only to determine the amounts due. 
4. While intervention seems to have been allowable,10 intervention did 
not often occur.11 
5. Attorneys' fees were, in a number of instances, paid out of the fund 
recovered or were paid by the losing defendant.12 
6. To determine the claims of the several members, the court has at 
times referred the matter to a master13 or trustee,14 and has sometimes 
used the technique of mathematical computation.15 The judgment in two 
4 Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952). 
5 Letter from Hirsch E. Soble, Esq., August 1, 1960. Mr. Soble states: "In a case 
such as this where the financial resources of the parties were so far apart, the full 
utilization of the discovery procedures can often result in injustice. I have witnessed 
this more than once. But that is the price we pay for civilization." 
6 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 
F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Co., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 
1948); Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ohio 1943). 
7 Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. App. 1952); Cohon v. Oscar 
L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958). 
s Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., supra note 7. The case was tried before Califor-
nia adopted the pre-trial practice. Counsel indicated that "obviously, a pre-trial conference 
would have been advantageous because a lot of these issues, so laboriously argued in 
the appellate court, could have been raised and determined at such a conference." 
9 Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ohio 1943) (FLSA). 
10 Ibid. Heffernan v. Bennett&: Armour Co., 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. App. 1952); Cohon v. 
Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958). 
11 Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., supra note 9. Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., 
supra note 10. 
12 Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., supra note 9; Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., 
supra note 10; Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958). 
13 Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., supra note 10. 
14 Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958). 
15 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945). 
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cases provided for the order and procedure by which the claims should be 
proved.16 
7. The petitions filed in the cases were predominantly in the general 
form, alleging that the claimants were too numerous to be joined and that 
the action was brought by the named plaintiffs for and in behalf of them-
selves and all others similarly situated.17 
8. Counsel uniformly indicated that there were benefits to be derived 
from maintaining an action in the class form.18 
One of the most detailed _?:"eplies was that of Branko M. Steiner, Esq., 
counsel in Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co.,19 a case which well illustrates the 
effective use of a class action. In that case "hundreds of persons," including 
the plaintiff, purchased wall-to-wall carpeting and installations from the 
defendant, Paris Co., and were charged a certain selling price, plus a 
Retailers' Occupation Tax. Before the institution of the present action the 
Paris company had brought an action to declare the collection of such taxes 
illegal and its cause was sustained by the Supreme Court of Illinois.20 
Thereafter, the present suit was brought by the plaintiff "in his own behalf 
and in behalf of others similarly situated" to compel the defendant to re-
pay all funds theretofore collected as the illegal taxes to the respective 
customers of the defendant. The petition filed was most carefully drafted. 
It recited, in part: 
"5. The customers of this defendant for whom this action is pros-
ecuted, are all similarly situated, having since 1949 purchased wall to 
wall carpeting from said defendant, and each having paid to it, a 
tax as a separate item, in addition to the charge made by defendant to 
each customer for the carpeting and padding, and the installation 
thereof. The taxes in question known as the Retailers' Occupation 
Tax, were separately passed on to, and paid by such customers to the 
defendant. The sums representing said charge for tax so paid by 
plaintiff and other customers to the defendant, represented a common 
fund, and in reality belonged to the defendant's customers who paid 
or deposited such taxes from which said fund was accumulated and 
was held by the defendant in trust. Such customers for and on behalf 
16 Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. App. 1952); Cohon v. 
Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958). 
17 Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Schempf v. Armour &: Co., 5 
F.R.D. 294 (D. Minn. 1946); Smith v. Stark Trucking Co., 53 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ohio 
1943); Heffernan v. Bennett &: Armour Co., supra note 16; Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 
supra note 16. 
18 One counsel replied: "I firmly believe a class action is effective in handling a 
multi-party problem where the members of the class are numerous. If one could not 
file a class action in such instances, it might well effectively preclude the prosecution 
of a meritorious claim." Letter from J. Benton Tulley, Esq., August 2, 1960. 
111 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958). 
20 Oscar L. Paris Co. v. Lyons, 8 Ill. 2d 590, 134 N.E.2d 755 (1956). 
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of whom the plaintiff prosecutes the instant cause of action, constitute 
a class, and since there are hundreds of them they are at this time un-
known to plaintiff and too numerous, it becomes highly impractical 
~o bring them all before the court. This action will prevent and avoid 
a multiplicity of suits. Plaintiff can and will prosecute this action by 
able counsel and all members of the class will be adequately and 
fully represented, whereas individually the tax as to any one individual 
would not be large enough to warrant any such litigation to recover 
it. One decision can and will determine the rights of all members of 
the class since the same issue is common to all such customers. The 
same common relief is sought by and for all said class of customers .... 
"10. Plaintiff files this suit in his own behalf and in behalf of 
others similarly situated who may care to join herein and pay their 
proportionate share of the costs, fees and expenses entailed in the pros-
ecution of this suit." 
A trustee was finally appointed by the court and in the decree the 
trustee was ordered to have published a notice to all the represented cus-
tomers. The "Notice to Customers of Oscar L. Paris Company" was in the 
following form: 
"If you purchased carpeting and the installation thereof from 
Oscar L. Paris Company during the period from January I, 1949 to and 
including September 30, 1955, you may be entitled to a refund in full 
of the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax applicable to such sale. 
Bring or send your paid invoice, cancelled check or similar evidence 
of such purchase to the office of [trustee]. This should be done before 
the 30th day of September, 1960, or the liability of Oscar L. Paris 
Company to make such refunds shall terminate." 
The trustee was ordered to furnish to the defendant a list of answering 
claimants within ten days after the limitation period set by the court and 
published in the above notice and the defendant was ordered to furnish to 
the trustee the amounts necessary to pay all such answering claimants. The 
trustee was further ordered to file a report with the court detailing the 
number of claims filed, amounts claimed and paid, amounts claimed but 
unpaid, and the amount of the reimbursement fund remaining in the 
possession of the defendant. Upon receipt of the report the court would 
then enter an order for the costs and expenses of obtaining the recovery, 
including attorneys' fees and expenses. 
The somewhat summary trustee proceedings seem justified since the 
"amounts due each of the individual members of the class were so com-
paratively insignificant that it would have been impossible, from a prac-
tical viewpoint, for each member of the class to file a separate suit for the 
amount due."21 The tax-refunds sum already in the hands of the defendant 
21 Letter from Branko M. Steiner, Esq., counsel for plaintiffs in customers' refund 
suit, Cobon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472 (1958). 
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makes this a hybrid-type representative suit case, and the judgment therefore 
is res judicata. But what if there had been no fund? Without a fund, what 
would be the technical legal effect under due process doctrines if the 
published notice cancelled defendant's whole liability as to any absentee 
parties who failed to make their claims in the pending suit against defend-
ant by September 30, 1960? In other words, could the personal rights of the 
individual "represented" claimants to sue separately similarly be terminated 
by the court if the situation were of the "spurious" type? It could be done 
and the spurious type class suit made a more useful device if there existed 
state legislation authorizing the trial court to make such an order upon its 
finding of "due representation" and "adequate protection" of rights of 
represented potential claimants, assuming that such legislation would be 
valid, and that judgments entered upon notice under it could satisfy con-
stitutional due process requirements. 
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